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BRIEF FOR THE N.A.A.C.P. LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE 
Interest of the Amicus Curiae 
"I am married to Raymond Fullwood, a Negro. Because 
I am Caucasian, in the five years of our marriage, we 
have been stopped no less than, twenty times by Los 
Angeles police officers. . . . I am certain that the rea-
son they chose to stop us is because we are a mixed 
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2 
couple." Mrs. Marilyn Fullwood, in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.1 
"Association of a woman with men of another race 
usually results in the immediate conclusion that she 
is a prostitute. If a Negro woman is found in the company
pany of a white man, she is usually confronted by the 
police and taken to the station 'unless it is clear that 
the association is legitimate." Detroit, Michigan police 
practice, as observed by Professor Wayne R. LaFave.2 
The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc., is a non-profit membership corporation, incorporated 
under the laws of the State of New York in 1939. It was 
formed to assist Negroes to secure their constitutional 
rights by the prosecution of lawsuits. Its charter declares 
that its purposes include rendering legal aid gratuitously 
to Negroes suffering injustice by reason of race or color 
who are unable, on account of poverty, to employ and en-
gage legal aid on their own behalf. The charter was ap-
1 Quoted in AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA, REPORT, POLICE MALPRACTICE ANDTHE WATTS RIOT 
15-16 (1965), reproduced in CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE 31 (1967). 
Cray documents for other cities as well as the prevalence of the 
police practice of accosting interracial couples. Id. at 227 n. 3. 
See also Rexroth, The Fuzz, 14 PLAYBOY (No. 7) 76 (July 1967). 
2 LAFAVE, ARREST-THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO Cus-
CUSTODY 455 ( 1965). See PRESIDENT'S Commission on LA w ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, T TASK FORCE REPORT: THE 
POLICE 184 (1967): "[F]ield interrogations are sometimes used in 
a way which discriminates against minority groups, the poor, and 
the juvenile. For example, the Michigan State Survey found, on 
the basis of riding \vith patrol units in two cities, that members of 
minority groups were often stopped, particularly if found in 
groups, in the company of white people, or at night in white 
neighborhoods, and that this caused serious problems." Cf. Dokes 
v. Arkansas, 0. T. 1967, No. 109. 
3 
proved by a New York court, authorizing the organization 
to serve as a legal aid society. The N.A.A.C.P. Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., is independent of other 
organizations and supported by contributions of funds 
from the public. 
A central purpose of the Fund is the legal eradication 
of practices in our society that bear with discriminatory 
harshness upon Negroes and upon the poor, derived, and 
friendless, who too often are Negroes. The stop and frisk 
procedure \vhich New York and Ohio ask this Court to 
legitimate in these cases is such a practice. The evidence 
is weighty and uncontradicted that stop and frisk power 
is employed by the police most frequently against the in-
habitants of our inner cities, racial minorities and the 
underprivileged.3 This is no historical accident or passing 
circumstance. The essence of stop and frisk doctrine is 
the sanctioning of judicially m1controlled and uncontrol-
lable discretion by law enforcement officers.4 History, and 
not in this century alone, has taught that such discretion 
comes inevitably to be used as an instrument of oppression 
3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAWw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: TIIE POLICE 183-185 
( 1967) ; 2 STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR 
METROPOLITAN AREAS (Field Surveys III) 82-108 (Report of a 
Research StudySubmitted to the President's Commission on Law 
Enforeement and Administration of Justice, 1967) [hereafter cited 
as University of Michigan Study] ; SKOLNICK JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 217-219 
( 1966); TIFFANY, MCINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING SF.ARCH & SEIZURE ENCOURAGEMENT & 
ENTRAPMENT 20-21 ( 1967) ; Schwartz (Herman), "Stop and Frisk" 
in New York Law and in Practice: A Case Studyin the Abdication
tion of Judicial Control Overthe Police (unpublished manuscript) 
31-34, and authorities cited. 
4 See part III, infra. 
579 
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4 
of the unpopular.5 It was so in the case of the search and 
seizure practices which the Fourth .Amendment was written 
to condemn. 6 We believe that that Amendment protects 
the unpopular, the Negro, and all our citizens alike, from 
subjection to the oppressive police discretion which stop 
and frisk embodies. 
In the litigation now before the Court-as is usual in 
cases where police practices are challenged-two parties 
essentially are represented. Law enforcement officials, 
legal representatives of their respective States, ask the 
Court to broaden police powers, and thereby to sustain 
what has proved to be a "good pinch." Criminal defen-
dants caught with the goods through what in retrospect 
appears to be at least shrewd and successful (albeit con-
stitutionally questionable) police work ask the Court to 
declare that work illegal and to reverse their convictions. 
Other parties intimately affected by the issues before the 
Court are not represented. The many thousands of our 
citizens who have been or may be stopped and frisked 
5 "Where lawless police forces exist, their activities may impair 
the civil rights of any citizen. In one place the brunt of illegal 
police activity may fall on suspected vagrants, in another on union 
organizers, and in another on unpopular racial and religious minor-
ities, such as Negroes, Mexicans, or Jehovah's Witnesses. But 
wherever unfettered police lawlessness exists, civil rights may be 
vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of dominant local 
groups, and to the caprice of individual policemen. Unpopular, 
weak, or defenseless groups are most apt to suffer." PRESIDENT'S 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT: To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 
25 ( 1947). See also TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 5-6 
(1964); CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE 113-127, 183-194 (1967); 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS' 
RIGHTS 6-13 (1967); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197, 203-204 
(4th Cir.1966) (en bane). 
6 See the history recounted in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 
U. S. 717 (1961), and Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). 
5 
yearly, only to be released when the police find them inno-
cent of any crime, are not represented. 7 The records of 
their cases are not before the Court and cannot be brought 
7 The prevalence of the practice of street detention and interro-
gation, and of the related practice of arrest for investigation, is 
universally acknowledged. Concerning the former, see PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 183-185; SKOLNICK, op. cit. supra, 
note 3, at 224-225; LAFAVE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 344-345; TIF-
FANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 5-86; 
Note, Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 
UTAH L. REV. 593, 610-616, 618 (1965); Note, Philadelphia Police 
Practices and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1189, 
1193, 1195, 1200-1206 ( 1952). Concerning the latter, see DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION-
COMMISSIONERS' COMMITTEE ON POLICE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION (1962) (The 
Horsky Report); LAFAVE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 300-364; TREBACH
BACH, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 4-7; Foote, Law and Police Practice: 
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 16 (1957); 
LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of 
Current Practices [1962], WASH. U. L. Q. 331. 
What proportion of persons subjected to these practices and 
frisked or searched is found to be innocent of any crime cannot 
now be reliably determined. The National Crime Commission's 
Task Force on Police describes a study finding that two out of ten 
persons "frisked" were found to be carrying either a gun or a 
knife. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 185. We have 
not been able to determine whether the study referred to is the 
same study (involving 224 cases) that is summarized in 2 University
versity of Michigan Study 87, but it appears to be. The summary 
coincides with the Task Force Report in showing that guns or 
knives were discovered in twenty-one per cent of personal searches 
by police. Like the Task Force Report, it does not purport to say 
what proportion of these weapons was illegally possessed. It does 
disclose that stolen property and other criminal evidence was very 
infrequently found, with the result that seventy-nine out of one 
hundred persons searched by police in confrontations originating 
"on view" were discovered to have nothing incriminating; and 
seventy-four out of one hundred persons searched in confrontations 
originating with a police dispatch also were discovered to have 
nothing incriminating. Most significant, the University of Michigan 
study makes clear what the Task Force Report leaves ambiguous: 
that the personal searches studied include (and may well be com-
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here. Yet it is they, far more than those charged with crime, 
who will bear the consequences of the rules of constitutional 
law which this Court establishes. The determination of the 
quantum of "belief" or "suspicion" required to justify the 
exercise of intrusive police authority is precisely the deter-
mination of how far afield from instances of obvious guilt the 
authority stretches. To lower that quantum is to broaden 
the police net and, concomitantly, to increase the number 
(and probably the proportion) 8 of innocent people caught 
prised primarily of) searches incident to a valid arrest on prob-
able cause. Id. at 89. This last circumstance doubtless explains the 
extraordinarily high yield (a little over 20 per cent) reported here, 
compared with the low yield elsewhere observed for police investi-
gative practices undertaken without probable cause-for example, 
the arrests for investigation studied in the Horsky Report, DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION-
ERS' COMMITTEE ON POLICE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION 34 (1962); 
Kamisar, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1506 (1963) (seven-
teen out of eighteen persons arrested for investigation are released 
without being charged), and the automobile stops and related prac-
tices mentioned in Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or 
Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & POL. Sci. 
402, 406 ( 1960). The data, of course, are fragmentary. Cf. the 
testimony of a retired Detroit policeman before the United States 
Civil Rights Commission, quoted in CRAY, op. cit. supra, note 5, 
at 185: 
"I would estimate-and this I have heard in the station also 
-that if you stop and search 50 Negroes and you getone good 
arrest out of it that's a good percentage; it's a good day's 
work. So, in my opinion, there are 49 Negroes whose rights 
have been misused, and that goes on every day. That's just 
about the entire population of Detroit over a period of time." 
8 Again, it is difficult to test this supposition empirically. See 
note 7 supra; and see Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards 
in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 16 (1957). However, if 
the sort of police judgment assumed alike by the differing concepts 
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion is at all rational, one 
would suppose that the less compelling the perceived evidence of 
guilt on which an officer acts, the higher proportion of persons he 
will affect who turn out to be innocent. 
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up in it. The innocent are those this Court will never see.9 
Yet we believe that some attention to their situation and 
appreciation of their interests is indispensable to the appropriate
propriate resolution of the constitutional controversy now 
presented. With deference, amicus curiae wishes to speak 
principally in behalf of their interests-which we conceive 
to be indistinguishable (but for the vagaries of a "reason-
able suspicion") from those of the citizenry generally. 
These interests, of course, are not adverse to those of 
the police, except insofar as the police interests may be 
quite parochially defined. The citizen on the street needs 
the protection of the police, amply empowered, just as he 
needs protection from them. He is the potential victim 
both of crime and of law enforcement. His interest does 
not lie in "handcuffing the police." But neither does it lie 
in giving the police every power over his life which they 
claim is indispensable to efficient crime control.10 Against 
9 "The statistical data [about abusive police practices] are difficult
cult to :find and document, for most people who are mistreated by 
the police tend to be poor, friendless, out-of-the-ordinary members 
of society and frequently in trouble with the law in other situations. 
They don't complain often, and when they do, seldom have the 
money, time, confidence in the 'system' or knowledge of the agencies
cies that could help them to thread their way through the maze of 
legal steps necessary to challenge the abuse. 
"Moreover, fear of reprisal by the police is quite real, especially 
among Negroes and other minorities, but this trepidation has no 
social or economic bounds. There is a general wish to 'stay out of 
trouble' among many white, middle-class citizens." AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE POWER and CITIZENS' RIGHTS 6 
( 1967). See also SKOLNICK, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 221-222, 233-
234. 
1° Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948): "Crime, 
even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave 
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on 
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a 
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom 
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that latter course the Fourth Amendment and every aspira-
tion of a free society oppose.11 
The parties have consented to the filing of an amicus 
curiae brief by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. Copies of their letters of consent will be 
submitted to the Clerk with this brief. 
from surveillance. Whenthe right of privacy must reasonably 
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." 
11 It is not so with some societies. Consider the extraordinarily 
efficient South African police practice reported in the New York 
Times, January 23, 1966: 
"JOHANNESBURG, Jan. 22-The police in Johannesburg 
have hit on an effective, if crude, way to reverse an alarming 
rise in armed robberies in the city: to treat every black man 
as a criminal suspect. 
"This is done by saturating a proscribed area with police-
men under orders to check the 'reference books'-the passports 
all blacks must carry in 'white' areas-of every African they 
encounter. Sometimes the orders also call for thorough searches 
of any parcels the blacks may be carrying, or even of their 
persons. 
"These police blitzes employ anywhere from 1,000 to 2,500 
officers each. They come without warning, usually to the city's 
business district . .. . 
"The arrests are almost always for irregularities in the ref-
erence books, not for armed robbery. But the effect is evi-
dently to keep criminals off the streets and off balance. Since 
early November the raids have been held almost weekly, with 
the result that the number of armed robberies has been re-
duced by more than 50 per cent. 
" 
"The undeniable success of the raids shows that it is not a 
fantastic notion for the white authorities to find a suspicion 
of criminality in a black skin-an indication of the extent to 
which this is a society at war with itself." 
9 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Issues. 
These stop and frisk cases present a congeries of issues. 
May a police officer constitutionally restrain an individual 
for the sole purpose of investigating him ? If so, under 
what circumstances? Upon probable cause to believe him 
guilty of a crime? Upon "reasonable suspicion"T12 What is 
the permissible extent of the restraint ? How long may it 
last ?13 How much force may be used to effect it ?May the 
police officer constitutionally search the citizen incident to 
such restraint, or incident to questioning without restraint¥ 
If so, under what circumstances ? \Vhenever a citizen is 
restrained or questioned ?When there is probable cause to 
believe (or when there is "reasonable suspicion") that the 
citizen is armed ?How instusivemay the search be? May 
some or all objects discovered in the search be admitted 
12The present cases do not present factually the question of the 
extent of police powers to "freeze" the scene of a recent and palpable
pable crime, as where patrol officers responding to a call find a man 
bleeding on the ground and others fleeing. Nor are those cases 
necessarily controlled by whatthe Court may hold here. 
13 The present cases do not present factually instances of extended
tended on-the-street detention. Nor do they present instances of 
removal of the citizen to a squad car or to the police station. However
ever, insofar as the New York statute here attacked on its face 
may allow extended detention and a shift in the locus of custody, 
this Court may properly consider the constitutionality of a stop-
and-frisk authorization which is not limited in the time or place of 
the detention it allows. Cf. Berger v. New York, -- U. S. --, 
87 S. Ct. 1873 ( 1967). 
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into evidence against the citizen m a criminal trial?
Weapons?ea Burglars' tools? Narcotics ?14 
This Court may wish to treat these issues more or less 
discretely. But their proliferation should not conceal the 
point that what is fundamentally in question here is the 
choice, under the Constitution, between two antagonistic 
models of the police investigative process. This is true 
conceptually, as study of the burgeoning literature of stop 
and frisk reveals.15 It is true historically, because the Court 
14 The present cases do not present factually the question whether 
objects seized in a frisk, other than those which it is illegal to 
possess, may be used in evidence in a criminal trial of the frisked 
citizen. However, because of the intimate relationship between the 
substantive constitutional rules regulating police conduct and the 
exclusionary sanction by which they are enforced, see part II, 
infra, the Court may wish to consider that question. 
15 Detailed and useful analyses of stop and frisk doctrine and 
related issues are found in AMERICAN LA w INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE 
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Tent. Draft No. 1, March 1, 
1966, Commentary on §2.02, at pp. 91-105; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS' COMMITTEE 
ON POLICE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION (1962) (The Horsky Re-
port) ; LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY 300-364 (1965); TIFFANY, l\ICINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DE-
TECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING & QUESTIONING, SEARCH & SEIZURE, 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 5-94 (1967); Barrett, Personal 
Rights, Property Rights, a.nd the Fourth Amendment [19601, Su-
SUPREME COURT REv. 46, 57-70; Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Deten-
Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and 
Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62 (1966); Foote, 
Law and Police Practice: Safeguardsin the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 16 (1957); Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle 
or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & POL. Ser. 
402 (1960); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: 
An Analysis of Current Practices (1962), WASH. U. L. Q. 331; 
I.;eagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. 
L., CRIM. & POL. ScI. 393 (1963); Remington, The Law Relating 
to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected
pected Persons and Police Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIM. & POL. Ser. 386 (1960); Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest 
and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L., 
11 
is now asked for the first time to legitimate criminal investi-
gative activity that significantly intrudes upon the privacy 
CRIM. & POL. SCI. 251 (1966); Warner, The Uniform Arrest act,
28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942); 'Vilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a 
Free Society: .A. Plea for 1.llodernization, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & 
PoL. SCI. 395 (1960); Note, Stop and Frisk in California, 18 HASTINGS
L. J. 623 (1967); Comment, Selective Detention and the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 158 (1966); Comment, Police 
Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 847 (1965); Note, Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City 
Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REv. 593 (1965); Symposium Note, 
The Law of Arrest: Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 
59 Nw. u.L. REV. 641 (1964); Note, Philadelphia Police Practices 
and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952); Note, 4 
HoustonL. REV. 589 (1966); Case Note, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 
(1966); Recent Statute, 78 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1964). 
See also STATE OF NEW YORK, TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, THE administration
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67-70 (1967); Aspen, Arrest 
and Arrest Alternatives: Recent Trends (1966), U. ILL. L. FORUM 
241, 250-253; Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: .A. Proposal 
for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1139-
1140 (1967); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: 
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the "Old" 
Voluntariness Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60-61 n. 8 (1966); Kami-
sar, Book Review, 16 HARV. L. REV. 1502 (1963); Kuh, Reflections 
on New York'sark's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality
tutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & PoL. SCI. 32 (1965) ; LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . .. Has Not ... Run 
Smooth" [1966], U. !LL. L. Forum 255, 308-311; Ronayne, The 
Right to Investigate and Newew York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 
FoRDHA::\I L. REV. 211 (1964); Schoenfeld, The "Stop and Frisk" 
Law is Unconstitutional, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 627 (1966); Siegel, 
The NewYork "Stop and Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: .A.re 
They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964); Traynor, 
Jlapp v. Ohio at Large in the FiftyStates [1962], DuKE L. J. 319, 
333-334; Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Un-
counselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the States, 44 
B. U. L. REV. 423 (1964) ; Note, "Stop and Frisk" and its Applica-
tion in the Law of Pennsylvania, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 488 (1967); 
Recent Decision, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (1967); Recent Case, 
71 DICK. L. REv. 682 (1967); Recent Decision, 5 DUQUESNE L. 
REV. 444 (1967); Note, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 449 (1967); Legislation, 
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 392, 398-405 (1964). 
587 
588 
12 
of individuals who are undi:fferentiable from Everyman as 
the probable perpetrators of a crime.18 It is true in the 
practical, day-to-day world of the streets and the lower 
courts, as we propose to develop more fully in the discus-
sion that follows. Initially it will be helpful, we believe, 
to identify the two contending models and their attributes. 
The Classical Arrest-Search Model 
Under classical criminal procedure, the police may accost 
and question any person for the purpose of criminal inves-
tigation.11 But they may not detain him, restrain or "arrest"
his liberty of movement in any significant way, except 
16 See notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text. 
Most of the older cases cited by the proponents of modern-day 
stop and frisk do no more than recognize that the police are free 
to question an individual on the street so long as they do not detain 
him in any way. Cases which denominate such questioning an 
"arrest," forbidden in the absence of probable c.ause, are generally 
found to involve circumstances in which the police communicated 
to the individual an effective sense of restraint. The decisions are 
discussed exhaustively in the literature cited in note 15 supra; 
note 18 infra. They are adequately summarized in the following 
passage from Recent Decision, 37 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (1938): 
" [A] lthough the courts rarely discuss the question, whether 
stopping and questioning is an arrest seems to be decided on 
the basis of ·whether any restraint of personal liberty is in-
volved. Thus, where force or threat of force is used and the 
subject submits to the authority of the officer for questioning, 
an arrest occurs. On the other hand, where the officer merely 
approaches or accosts the suspect and asks him questions, 
there is no arrest because there is no restraint of the person. 
Still other courts hold that merely stopping a traveler on the 
highway is an arrest." 
So far as we are aware, no one seriously contends that the police 
are or should be prohibited from non-coercive questioning of an in-
dividual on the street, provided that it remains clear to him that 
he is free to leave and to refuse to answer questions. We, certainly
tainly, would not so contend. 
13 
for the purpose of holding him to answer criminal charges.18 
Any such restraint of an individual is an arrest, and may 
be made only on probable cause to believe him guilty of an 
offense.19 The police may not make a personal search of an 
individual, without a warrant or effective consent, except 
18 "The police have no power to detain anyone unless they charge 
him with a specified crime and arrest him accordingly. Arrest 
and imprisonment are in law the same thing. Any form of physical 
restraint is an arrest, and imprisonment is only a continuing ar-
rest. If an arrest is unjustified, it is wrongful in law and is known 
as false imprisonment. The police have no power whatever to de-
tain anyone on suspicion or for the purpose of questioning him. 
They cannot even compel anyone whom they do not arrest to come 
to the police station." DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENG-
LAND 82-83 ( 1958). Accord: Williams, Police Detention and Ar-
rest Privileges under Foreign Law: England, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. 
& PoL. SCI.413, 413-414 ( 1960). This is assumed by the principal 
American writers on arrest, see Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 
28 VA. L. REv. 315, 318 ( 1942) ; Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 
TEXAS L. REV. 275, 279 (1946); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 
IOWA L. REv. 201, 261 (1940); Wilgus, Arrest Without a War-
rant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 798 (1924). It is also assumed in. this 
Court's decisions under the Fourth Amendment, see note 54 
infra. Concerning the "charging purpose" component of classical 
arrest theory, see note 55 infra. 
Nothing said here touches the question what powers police may 
have to take custody of an individual for non-criminal purposes-
as when a sick or drunk adult or a lost child is found on the street. 
The question is not now before the Court. 
19 E.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964). See 
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law 
of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & PoL. SCI. 402: 
"In the law of arrest and by long constitutional history, 
'reasonable' has been interpreted as the equivalent of probable 
cause. An officer acts reasonably if, on the facts before him, 
it would appear that the suspect has probably committed a 
specific crime. This is the context in which the word is used 
in the fourth amendment and in most state arrest laws. Our 
cases sharply distinguish the reasonableness of an arrest on 
probable cause from an unreasonable apprehension grounded 
on 'mere' suspicion." 
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that, incidental to a valid arrest, they may make a more or 
less intensive personal search.20 The Classical Arrest-
Search Model thus recognizes two categories of police in-
vestigative powers. Powers whose exercise does not signifi-
cantly invade personal liberty and the right of privacy-the 
"right to be let alone" 21-are given the police to use at 
large, indiscriminately, at their discretion, and without ju-
dicial supervision. Powers whose exercise does invade these 
rights may be used by the police, but not indiscriminately, 
not against Everyman. They may be used only against 
persons whom there is probable cause, to believe are crim-
inal actors, and hence distinguishable from Everyman. 
The "probable cause" determination made by a policeman 
20 See note 54 infra concerning search incident to arrest. It 
is plain that a personal search without a warrant, not incident to 
arrest, is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. 
Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964); 
and see Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966). 
21 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U. S. 438, 471, 4 78:.479 ( 1928) : 
"The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much 
broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook 
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. 
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are found 
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thought, their emotions and their sensations. 
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the most valued 
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individ-
ual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in 
a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intru-
sion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth." 
Justice Brandeis' view, of course, has subsequently been vindi-
cated by the Court. Berger v. New York, -- U. S. -- , 87 S. Ct. 
1873 ( 1967) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 4 79 ( 1965). 
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as the precondition of the exercise of these powers is 
judicially reviewable.22 "The rule of probable cause is 
a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best 
compromise that has been found for accommodating 
these often opposing interests [of law enforcement and 
personal liberty]. Requiring more would unduly hamper 
law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abid-
ing citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." 23 
The Stop-Frisk Model 
In theory, the Stop-Frisk Model differs from the Classical 
Arrest-Search P2'(/P2'(/odel in that it recognizes at least three, 
perhaps more, categories of police powers.2"' First, police 
may accost and question any person, so long as they do not 
restrain or search him. Second, they may arrest him on 
probable cause and search his person incident to that valid 
arrest. The third category of powers is lodged between 
these two . .A law enforcement officer lacking probable cause 
but having some state of mind (or encountering some cir-
cumstances) which makes his focus upon a given individual 
something other than random, something more particular-
22 "The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep 
in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the 
person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, 
against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppres-
sive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on sus-
picion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no 
showing of 'probable cause' before a magistrate was required." 
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959). 
23 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949) (a case 
of warrantless search), quoted in Beck v. Ohio, 3i9 U. S. 89, 91 
( 1964) (a case of warrantless arrest). 
24 The conceptual basis for the Model may involve the repudia-
tion of any attempt to categorize, leaving every individuated in-
stance of police activity to be determined lawful or unlawful, 
constitutional or unconstitutional, through a "balancing" of its 
intrusiveness against its justification. See note 57 infra. 
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ized than whim, may ''stop" or detain the individual without 
an "arrest." The nature of the prerequisite state of mind 
(or set of circumstances) varies. The Uniform Arrest Act 
uses the phrase "reasonable ground to suspect." 25 New 
York Code of Criminal Procedure, § 180-a, employs ''reason-
ably suspects." The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure uses other formulations. 26 The common 
theme is something less than probable cause, but something 
which purports to provide a judicial curb against wholly 
indiscriminate police action. 
The nature of the "stop" that is not an arrest also varies. 
The Uniform Arrest Act permits an officer, unsatisfied by 
initial answers to questioning, to detain his suspect for two 
hours. The A. L. I. Model Code limits the period to twenty 
minutes, and expressly disallows the use of deadly force in 
effecting a "stop." The New York statute is silent both on 
the period of permitted detention and on the amount of 
force which the officer may employ to enforce it. Specific 
"stop" authorizations also differ as to whether the "stop-
ping" officer is allowed to remove his detainee from the 
25 Uniform Arrest Act, § 2. The Act is set out in Warner, The 
Uniform .Arrest Act, 28 V .A. L. REV. 315, 343, 344 ( 1942). Versions 
of the Act (using the terms "reasonably suspects" or "reason to 
suspect") are in effect in Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode 
Island. Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, §§ 1902-1903 (1953); N. H. Rev. 
Laws, § § 594 :2-594 :3 ( 1955) ; and Rhode Island, R. I. Gen. Laws, 
§§ 12-7-1-12-7-12 (1956). The Act appears to have been gutted 
by judicial construction at least in Delaware and Rhode Island, 
see De Salvatore v. State, 2 Storey (Del.) 550, 163 A. 2d 244 
(1960); Kavanaugh v. Stenhouse, 93 R. I. 252, 174 A. 2d 560 
(1961), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
tion, 368 U. S. 516 (1962). These decisions appear to equate rea-
sonable suspicion with the constitutional standard of probable 
cause. 
26 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE, § 2.02, Tentative Draft No. 1, March 1, 1966, at p. 6. 
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scene of their first encounter.21 They differ with regard to 
the places in which and the circumstances under which the 
"stop" power is given. The Uniform Arrest Act allows 
stops of persons "abroad." The A. L. I. Code has no such 
restriction, but delimits the stop power by providing that it 
shall not be used "solely to aid in investigation or preven-
tion of" designated offenses. The New York statute uses 
the term "abroad in a public place" (which the Court of 
Appeals in Peters construed to include the common hall-
ways of apartment buildings, inconsistently with the con-
struction previously put on the phrase in a circular pub-
lished for police guidance by the New York State Combined 
Council of Law Enforcement Officials),28 and also delimits 
the "reasonable suspicion" to suspicion of felonies and des-
ignated misdemeanors. 
Under the Stop-Frisk Model, persons authorized to be 
detained may also be "frisked" or searched. (Undoubtedly, 
a legislature might give the power to "stop" without ae-
companying power to "frisk," but all of the significant 
pieces of legislation so far proposed or enacted couple 
"stop" with "frisk," and the proponents of stop and frisk 
seem unanimous that "frisk" is necessary if "stop" is to 
be effective. 29 Frisk may be allowed whenever stop is al-
27 The Uniform .Arrest Act, § 2(2), (3) implicitly permits re-
moval to a station house. The A. L. I. Model Code, § 2.02 (1), (2), 
(3) more or: less explicitly disallows it. The New York Courts, 
construing the New York statute, appear to permit it. People v. 
Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65, 204 N. E. 2d 176 (1964); People v. Hoff-
man, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N. Y. S. 2d 651 (1965). 
28 See pp. 54-55, infra. 
29 E.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE, Commentary to § 2.02, Tent. Draft No. 1, March 
1, 1966, at p. 102; Remington, supra, note 15, at 391; Symposium 
Note, supra, note 15, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. at 652-653. 
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lowed; or it may be allowed only upon the fulfilment of 
additional conditions, such as the existence of reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the officer is in danger.30 It may be 
allowed more or less extensively31 and more or less intru-
sively. 32 Its object may be limited or unlimited,33 and the 
nature of the items discovered in the search which may be 
30 The Uniform Arrest Act, § 3, allows search whenever the of-
ficer "has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the 
person possesses a dangerous weapon." (Emphasis added.) The 
A. L. I. Model Code allows search if the officer "reasonably be-
lieves that his safety so requires." The New York statute purports 
to limit the search power to situations in which the officer "rea-
sonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb," but the 
Court of Appeals in the Peters case appears to have read that re-
striction out of the statute, by force of a presumption of law 
that an officer making a stop is always ipso facto in danger of life 
or limb. 
31 The Uniform Arrest Act, § 3, and the New York statute au-
thorize search of the "person" stopped. The New York courts 
have extended the search power to packages carried by that person, 
even though these might be put out of his reach during the period 
of the stop. People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65, 204 N. Y. 2d 176 
(1964); People v. Reason, --- Misc. 2d --, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 196 
(Sup. Ct. 1966) ; see People v. Cassesse, 47 Misc. 2d 1031, 263 
N. Y. S. 2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1965). The A. L. I. Model Code explicitly 
allows the search of the stopped "person and his immediate sur-
roundings, but only to the extent necessary to discover any dan-
gerous weapons which may on that occasion be used against the 
officer." 
32 See the provision of the A. L. I. Model Code quoted in the 
preceding footnote. The Commentary to the section explains that 
the "search envisaged here should not usually be more intensive than 
an 'external feeling of clothing,' that is, the traditional 'frisk.' " 
AMERICAN LA w INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-
CEDURE, Commentary on § 2.02, Tentative Draft No. 1, March 1, 
1966, at p. 102. Neither the Uniform Arrest Act nor the New 
York statute restrict the intrusiveness of searches, except perhaps 
by implication in specifying a weapon as the object of search. 
But see pp. 50-51, infra. 
33 The Uniform Arrest Act, A. L. I. Model Code, and New York 
statute alike specify a dangerous weapon as the object of per-
mitted search. 
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seized may also be limited or unlimited.34 The common 
characteristic of the "frisk" authorizations is that they 
seek to delimit in some fashion the personal searches that 
may be made incident to a "stop," but none apparently 
include within the limitations any requirement of probable 
cause (in the classical sense) to believe that the person 
searched has a weapon. 
It is relatively clear that the Classical Arrest-Search 
P2P2'(/'(/odel was and is the common law of England, which 
has never permitted detention for investigation nor on 
less than probable cause.35 The same model has also been 
3 °' Both the Uniform Act and the New York statute .give the of-
ficer power to seize a weapon. This might appear to exclude power 
to seize other items found, but of course the New York courts 
have not given it this effect. The A. L. I. Model Code leaves the 
question for later resolution. 
35 This is the interpretation of the English law by such cele-
brated scholars of that law as Sir Patrick Devlin and Glanville 
Williams. See NOTE 18 supra. WE recognize that some American 
commentators have purported to find a warrant for detention with-
out probable cause in the old English books. E.g., Kuh, supra, note 
15. But the authorities upon which they rely, principally Lawrence 
v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14. 128 Eng-. Rep. 6 (C. P. 1810); 2 HALE, 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 89. 96-97 (1st Amer. ed. 1847); 2 HAWKINS, 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 118-132 (8th ed. 1824). entirely fail to support
port any such principle, as the more careful American studies 
make clear. See Leagre. supra, note 15, at 408-411; Comment, 
Police Power to Stop, Frisk and Question Suspected Persons, 65 
COLUM. L. REv. 847, 851-852 (1965). The Americans who trace 
stop-and-frisk to the English books have simply permitted themselves
to be confused EEBY the English use of the term "reasonable 
suspicion" which is not the equivalent of the same form of words 
used in the Uniform Arrest Act and New York's stop and frisk 
legislation, but is the equivalentof American constitutional "prob-
able cause." Hale makes this clear enough. See 2 HALE, op. cit. 
supra 76-86, 110. And see Thomas, Arrest; A General View, 
( 1966) CRIM. L. REV. 639, and comments following. There does 
appear to be in English law some patchwork statutory authorization
tion for stops and searches without warrant. rather in the nature 
of the usual American game-law inspections. Whether probable 
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invariably assumed by this Court to describe the constitu-
tional law of the Fourth Amend.ment.36 This is more than 
historical rappenstance. For the root notion of "probable 
cause" which is mainstay of the model is not simply a long 
cherished Anglo-American symbol of individual liberty. 
It is, in view of the practical realities of criminal adminis-
tration, an inevitable evolutionary product of our system's 
use of courts to confine police power within reasonable 
bounds consistent with the conscience of a free people. 
cause is required for these is not wholly clear, but it seems to be, 
see Thomas, The Law of Search and Seizure; Further Ground for 
Rationalisation, (1967) ·CRIM. L. REV. 3, 11-18, and comments fol-
lowing. In any event, the statutes are of very limited scope, as 
Glanville Williams has noted. Williams, supra, note 18, at 414 .. 
36 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Henry v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 
253 ( 1960). Brinegar explicitly repudiates the grounds of deci-
sion of the lower courts in that case, purporting to authorize an 
automobile stop not amounting to a search on reasonable suspicion 
not amounting to probable cause. The Henry decision is plainly 
based on the same rejection of the same conception. (we can 
hardly believe that the Solicitor General's concession as to the 
point of arrest in Henry was dispositive of the view the Court 
took of the matter.) And Rios cannot possibly be read as anything 
but a repudiation of stop and frisk. Although the force of the 
decision has been slighted by some, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary on 
§ 2 .. 02, Tentative Draft NO.1, March 1, 1966, at p. 94, the Rios 
opinion is not comprehensible on any other theory. The Govern-
ment argued at length in Rios for the recognition of a power of 
limited detention without arrest or probable cause. The Court's 
opinion waswritten to identify for the lower court on remand the 
issues posed for its factual resolution. Those issues were, simply, 
when there occurred an arrest and whether at that time the ar-
resting officers had probable cause. These are the issues framed 
by the Classical Arrest-Search Model, with its two categories of 
police powers-those given officers with probable cause (including 
arrest), and those given officers without. If the Court had 
imagined that the Stop-Frisk Model presented an alternatively 
permissible way of viewing the case, it is simply inconceivable 
that its opinion would not have identified for the district court the 
quite distinct issues (involving several degrees of detention, with 
severalaccompanying states of justification) posed by that model. 
21 
n. 
The Genius of Probable Cause. 
Whatever uncertainties there may be in the pre-Con-
stitutional history37 and the post-Constitutional evolution 
of the Fourth Amendment, two core conceptions of the 
.Amendment emerge with indisputable clarity. First, the 
.Amendment's purpose is to restrict the allowance of in-
trusive police investigative powers to circumstances of 
particularized justification, disallowing police discretion 
to employ those powers against the citizenry in general. 
Second, this restriction is enforced by the interposition 
of judicial judgment between the police decision to intrude 
and the allowability of intrusion. 
The first conception is visible upon the face of the Amend-
ment. It is the essential idea that gives meaning both to 
the requirement of "probable cause" and to the require-
ment of warrants "particularly describing" the place to be 
searched, and the things or persons to be seized. Concern-
ing both the occasions and extent of police intrusion upon 
the individual, "nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer .... " Berger v. New York, -- U. S. --, -, 
87 S. Ct. 1873, 1883 (1967), quoting Marron v. United 
States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 (1927). 
37 The history is canvassed in the Stanford and Marcus decisions 
cited supra, note 6, and in LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
INTERPRETATION (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
Science, ser. 84, no. 1) 19-48 (1966); LASSON, THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENTTO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and 
Political Science, ser. 40, no. 2) 13-105 (1937) ; Fraenkel, Concerning
ing Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1921). 
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History tells us why. The general warrants and writs of 
assistance against which the Fourth Amendment was 
principally aimed were vicious precisely because they "per-
mitted the widest discretion to petty officials." 38 "Armed 
with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of un-
known off enders; and unable to take evidence, listened to 
rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses. They held in their 
hands the liberty of every man whom they pleased to sus-
suspect." 39 This practice was doubly damnable. In a society 
profoundly committed to the liberty of the subject, the 
notion that government should be given the power to in-
trude indiscriminately and at the mere will of its officers 
into the affairs of every citizen was wholly unacceptable. 
Neither the random visitations of the King's messengers 
nor the practice in its more terrifying forms as an increas-
ingly powerful bureaucracy might develop it - such as the 
South African "blitz" described in note 11 supra - were to 
be countenanced in this free country. Government could 
not invade the province _of Everyman. To further its im-
portant purposes, including criminal investigation, it might 
invade the provinces of some individual men, but only 
those whom circumstances sufficiently distinguished from 
the generality of men so that the invasion could not be 
broadside.40 The general warrant infringed this concern 
38 Fraenkel, supra, note 37, at 362. 
39 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 483 (1965), quoting 2 MAY'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 246 (Amer. ed. 1864). 
40See Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention, 3 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES 588 (2d ed. 1836): 
"I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing 
our personal rights seems not to have pervaded the minds of 
men; for many other valuable things are omitted :-for in-
stance, general warrants, by which an officer may search sus-
pected places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, 
23 
and was accordingly denounced as a " 'ridiculous warrant 
against the whole English nation.' " 41 
In addition, the unbounded discretion allowed under the 
general warrants and writs of assistance left government 
officers free to heed every urging of personal spite, paltry 
tyranny, arbitrariness and discrimination. "In effect, com-
plete discretion was given to the executing officials; in the 
words of James Otis, their use 'placed the liberty of every 
man in the hands of every petty officer.'" 42 "The right of 
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion 
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals. Power is a heady thing, and history shows that 
the police acting on their own cannot be trusted." 43 So 
the Fourth Amendment was designed both to delimit the 
breadth of power and to constrain the possibility of 
its abuse. Its language sometimes SPEAKS obscurely in the 
contextof twentieth century circumstances, "but this much 
is certain: there is no authority [in any American gov-
or seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be 
prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized, 
any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, 
without any evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred 
may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. 
we have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants 
here than they have in England, because there, if a person 
be confined, liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of 
habeas corpus. But here a man living many hundred miles 
from the judges may get in prison before he can get that 
writ." 
For a brilliant modern expression of the same concern, with par-
ticular reference to police street interrogation. see Reich, Police 
Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L. J. 1161 ( 1966). 
41 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 483 (1965), quoting 2 MAY'S
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 247 (Amer. ed. 1864). 
42 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 n. 22 (1961), 
quoting TUDOR, LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 66 (1823). 
43 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948). 
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ernment] for the molestation of all those on whom the 
long shadow of suspicion falls in the hope that something 
damaging might turn up in the course of the search." 44 
Not surprisingly, these concerns of the Fourth Amendment
ment converge with others that our society has found essen-
tial and given enduring constitutional expression. They 
deserve to be recalled here, because all are threatened by 
the Stop-Frisk Model of criminal investigative process. 
The Fifth Amendment Privilege also forbids government 
to treat suspicion as guilt and to throw upon the citizen 
the obligation to exculpate or explain himself to a govern-
ment officer. lvliranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
It denies government power to employ coercive force of 
any sort (be it brief or extended physical restraint or other 
means of compulsion) to secure the cooperation of the 
citizen in pursuing law enforcement efforts that may secure 
his own criminal conviction. Ibid. Lessons to which the 
First Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth respond havetaught us the impermissibility 
of making law enforcement officers the unconstrained rulers 
of the streets. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 
(1965).45 And our especial national history has given 
44 LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra, note 37, at 46. 
45 "Literally read, ... the second part of this ordinance says 
that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham 
only at the whim of any police officer of that city. The constitutional
stitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration
tion. It 'does not provide for government by clearly defined 
laws, but rather for .government by the moment-to-moment 
opinions of a policeman on his beat.' Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U. S. 536, 579 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice BLACK). Instinct
stinct with its ever-present potential for arbitrarily suppressing
First Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the 
hallmark of the police state." Id. at 90-91. 
See also Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
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us the Equal Protection Clause as a bulwark both against 
arbitrary and discriminatory abuses of our citizens by 
government officials,46 and against the dangerous gener-
ality of governmental authorizations rife with the potential 
for such abuses. 41 
But the Fourth Amendment, most specifically addressed 
to protecting these concerns where they may be threatened 
by powers exercised in the investigative process, provides 
its own singular procedural mechanism for the neces-
sary accommodation of individual privacy and investiga-
tion. That mechanism is judicial review of the police justi-
fication offered to support an investigative intrusion. Time 
and again this Court has repeated the theme: 
"The point of the Fourth .Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the of ten 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magis-
trate's disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search 
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a 
46 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); cf. Wrigkt v. Geor-
gia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963). 
47 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); cf. Niemotko 
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
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nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in 
the discretion of police officers." 48 
The Court has insisted upon procedures which assure that 
the judicial determination will be rendered as an indepen-
dent judgment, not a mere routine validation of police dis-
cretion. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). Al-
though the requirement of prior judicial authorization of 
police intrusions has sometimes been excused on considera-
tions of history and practicability, the provision of some 
available and effective judicial review of the police has 
always been insisted upon. See Henry v. United States, 361 
U. S. 98, 104 (1959). Whether the forum be a criminal 
trial against the individual who claims abuse of the police 
investigative power, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), 
or a damage action by the individual, Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961), a court sits to provide in the last analysis 
the "neutral and detached" judgment which the Fourtn 
Amendment commands. This is no less true of arrests than 
of other searches and seizures. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 
(1964). 
Within this framework, the significance and the unique 
genius of the "probable cause" concept is apparent. "Prob-
able cause" is not a self-efficient talisman. Nothing depends 
upon the words themselves. "Probable cause" is not inher-
ently more :fit for use than the verbalism "reasonable sus-
suspicion" (which the English have long used to serve the 
same function).49 But as it has evolved, probable cause 
48 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948), quoted in 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 614-615 (1961). See 
also LANDYNSKr, op. cit. supra, note 37, at 47. 
49 See note 35 supra. 
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has taken on an operative meaning and efficiency that is 
inherently fit-indeed, irreplaceable--as an instrument for 
mediating the demands of order and liberty in criminal 
investigation. The particular efficacy assigned to it in the 
Beck opinion, id. at 91, bears repeating: "[P] robable cause 
is a practical, non-technical conception affording the best 
compromise that has been found for accommodating these 
often opposing interests." 50 
Probable cause is addressed bluntly to the issuof par-
ticularized justification that is the Fourth Amendment's 
first principle. As it has developed judicially, the phrase 
connotes exactly that quantum of evidence pointing to likely 
or probable guilt that serves to single an individual out 
reasonably persuasivelyfrom the mass of men. It is the 
standard designed to distinguish him from Everyman with 
sufficient sureness that, if the individual's arrest or search 
be authorized, Everyman's arrest or search will not be 
authorized by parity of reasoning. 
To serve such a function-to protect the "liberty of every 
man" 51 from subjection to police discretion-a test must 
be relatively objective The probable cause standard seeks 
precisely to objectify, to regularize, the reasoning process 
by which the judgment of allowability of police intrusions 
is made. Of course, no judgmental standard governing an 
issue of this sort can wholly eliminate the influence of sub-
suBJectiveand impressionistic responses-particularly a stand-
ard composed for general service in a multitude of varying 
factual circumstances. And so (as the proponents of the 
Stop-Frisk Model are quick to point out) even the Justices 
50 See text at note 23 supra. 
51 See text at note 42 supra. 
603 
28 
of this Court have from time to time divided in applying 
"probable cause" to the facts of one case or another. But 
the probable cause conception does operate--and its essen-
tial design makes it operate with peculiar efficiency-to 
diminish as much as is institutionally possible the impact 
of subjective factors. 
First, probable cause invokes that traditional juridical 
device for the depersonalization of judgment: the enforced 
perspective of the "reasonable man" or "ordinary man." 
Second, it frames very specifically the question which it 
purports to submit to the ordinary judgment of the "ORDINARY
nary man." The question is one of objective factual prob-
abilities: is the individual whose arrest is sought to be 
justified likely guilty on the perceived facts " No debatable 
issue of values is expressly submitted. Doubtless, police-
men and judges do in fact import some normative considera-
tions into the determination. They may conclude "likely 
enough guilty," or "not likely enough guilty." But this is 
a small matter compared to- tests (the inevitableinstruments 
of the Stop-Frisk Model, as we shall see) which baldly in-
vite consideration of the normative desirability of the par-
ticular police practice sought to be justified: "Is the sus-
pect likely enough guilty so that he should be arrested ?"
"Is he likely enough guilty so that he should not be ar-
rested, but should be detained ?" There are no answers to 
such questions that do not turn almost entirely upon one's 
personal approval or disapproval of arrest or of detention. 
Third, probable cause speaks to policeman's, to the judge's 
and to the citizen's common thought processes as rational 
men. Although it may take account of the specialized 
lmowledge and the expert perceptual accuity of the police-
man (to the extent that these can be objectified and com-
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municated to a court), it subjects them to review by ordi-
nary judgment operating upon objective facts. It avoids 
the dangerous mysticism of police professional, and pro-
fessionally motivated, intuition-what Mr. Justice Jackson 
recognized as the mobilized mentality of "the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." 52 (We shall discuss the characteristics of that men-
tality more fully in the next section of this brief.) Probable 
cause therefore directs the judge toward an exercise of 
independent and autonomous judgment, properly respon-
sive to the policeman's expert capacity for observation and 
induction, but freed from the controlling imposition of 
police value judgments or from necessary reliance upon 
the policeman's inexplicable "hunches" which inevitably 
embody those value judgments. 
In short, probable cause is a common denominator for 
police, judicial and citizen judgment. It permits the judge, 
after hearing the officer's account of his observations and 
his inferences from them, to pass a detached, independent 
and objective judgment on the rationality of those infer-
inferences. It permits the judge to express his judgment in 
terms that are more or less comprehensible to the police, 
for their future guidance. The same terms are more or less 
accessible to the citizen who wants to know his rights or to 
pass political judgment in turn upon a system which func-
tions as the probable cause system does.53 This is not to 
52 See text at note 48 supra. 
53 One of the attorneys for amicus curiae has been for a while 
adviser to a law student program under which students teach an 
eight-week course in basic legal rights to ghetto-area high school 
children in a large Eastern city. The law students report that the 
concept of "probable cause" is one of the easiest to communicate 
to their pupils. Even children who have endless complaints to 
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say that "probable cause" functions unerringly, or with 
perfect clarity. Of course, it does not. No standard for the 
case-by-case determination of the legitimacy of police in-
vestigative intrusions could. But the very failings of "probable
able cause" in this regard, together with its relative suc-
cesses, caution against its abandonment in favor of more 
arcane, more impressionistic, less objective, less histori-
cally developed standards. It should not be forgotten that 
probable cause is the only standard which this Court has 
ever developed under the Fourth Amendment for judicial 
regulation of the police.54 We think that the nature of the 
voice about real or supposed police mistreatment (and this appears 
to be the case for a very large number of the children) are able 
to appreciate and will admit the legitimacy of police stops, arrests 
and searches of "innocent" people where appearances of guilt 
amounting to probable cause (as developed by discussion of hypo-
thetical cases) exist. 
54 Probable cause is, of course, the constitutional standard for 
the issuance of both search warrants, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 
108 (1964), and arrest warrants, Giordenello v. United States, 357 
U. S. 480 ( 1958) ( constitutionaliZedin Aguilar supra). warrantless
less searches may be made only in a handful of historically de-
fined situations (see Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 (1938); 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stoner v. California
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Berger v. New York, -- U.S. -- , 
87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967)): incident to a validarrest (in which case, 
of course, probable causeuse is required for the arrest; and cf. Cooper
v. California, 376 U. S. 58 (1967)); in the case of moving vehicles 
(where probable cause is required, see Carroll v. United States, 
267 r. S. 132 (1923); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104 
( 1959) ) ; and in certain emergencies or "exigent circumstances" 
where there is no time to obtain a warrant (in which case, the 
existence of the criminal circumstances creating the emergency 
must be established by probable cause, SchMerber V California, 
384 .U. S. 575 (1966); cf. Warden v. Hayden, -- U.S. -- , 87 
S. Ct. 1642 (1967) ). (We put aside the consent doctrine, bot-
tomed on a theory of waiver, see Stoner v. California, supra.) 
Although warrantless arrests may be made under a greater range 
of circumstances than warrantless searches, the constitutional 
standard for warrantless arrest is also probable cause. Wong Sun 
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concept and the setting of its use as we have just described 
them demonstrate the inevitably, as well as the wisdom, of 
this development. We turn now to the "reasonable sus-
SUSpicion" construct with which the Stop and Frisk Model 
undertakes-for partial but vitally important purposes-
to displace probable cause. 
m. 
The Deceptive Allure of "Reasonable Suspicion." 
At first blush, the argument for a Stop-Frisk MODEL of 
criminal investigation, controlled by the standard of "reasonable
sonable suspicion," seems eminently, beguilingly reason-
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 
(1964). In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), the 
Court explicitly rejected the argument that warrantless stops of 
automobiles (amounting, in the view of the courts below, to less 
than "searches") could be made without probable cause. And the 
Court has recently extended the -warrant requirement, with its 
probable cause constraint, to some sorts of non-criminal regulatory 
searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, -- U. S. -- , 87 S. Ct. 
1727 ( 1967). In the latter cases, "probable cause" may not neces-
sarily mean probability of individual culpability, as it does in the 
criminal area (see Berger v. New York, supra), but it does pre-
serve its individualizing function, requiring scrutiny to assure "that 
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting 
an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwell-
ing," 87 S. Ct. at 1736. 
The only exception to the probable cause requirement in this 
Court's jurisprudence touching law enforcement practices is the 
"border search" doctrine announced in dictum in the Carroll case, 
supra. In that area, no form of judicial regulation was intended 
by the Court be substituted for probable cause, nor has any such 
regulation developed. Customs and immigration officials at the 
border are simply permitted to search as and when they will. E.g., 
Blefare v. United States, 362 F. 2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966). The 
unique justifications for that principle range too far afield to 
justify discussion here. 
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able.55 Surely, say the proponents of stop and frisk, our 
inherited notions of "arrest" and "search" and "probable 
cause" are too dogmatic, too inflexible. Not all police in-
trusions are equally intrusive. Therefore, the same degree 
55 The argument which we address in text is that which seems 
to have persuaded the New York and Ohio courts, and which is 
expounded by the most persuasive proponents of stop and frisk. 
There is also another argument frequently made to square the 
Stop-Frisk Model with the Fourth Amendment which is so palpably 
insubstantial as not to require extended answer. This argument 
goes: (1) The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an 
"arrest"; (2) an "arrest" is "the taking of a person into custody 
in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for an offense" 
(quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 18, Official Draft, June 15, 1930, or some similar text); 
( 3) but a "stop" (or an "arrest for investigation") lacks the 
charging purpose of an "arrest" (i.e., the person detained is not 
detained "in order that he may be forthcoming to answer") ; ( 4) 
therefore, a "stop" is not an "arrest"; ( 5) hence, a "stop" may 
be made without probable cause. There are three things wrong 
with this argument. (A) Its premise is wrong. Common-law doc-
trine did not require "charging purpose" as an element of an 
arrest. It is true that some criminal procedure codes authorized 
an arrest only for the purpose of charging a citizen with crime. 
(Not even all of these, it should be noted, including "charging 
purpose" in their definitions of "arrest," as the A. L. I. Code 
commentary recognizes, see id. at 227-228.) But the body of com-
mon-law lore whose purpose was to define the citizen's right 
against arrest-the tort law of false imprisonment-treated any 
restraint of liberty, whether with or without charging purpose, as 
an arrest. See Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the 
Law of Search and Seizure: A. Study in Misconception, 71 D1cK. 
L. REV. 379, 390-391 (1967); Note, Philadelphia Police Practices 
and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1185-1188 (1952). 
(B) Its conclusion does not follow from its premise. Even were 
it true that a common-law "arrest" required charging purpose, it 
would not follow that a detention without charging purpose was 
legal at common law. The point which the argument misses is that, 
at common law, the only detention that was lawful at all was one 
which an officer (or private citizen) could justify under his priv-
ilege of arrest. See Remington, supra, note 15, at 387. The com-
mon law gave no power, with or without probable cause, to detain 
any person for any purpose other than to char.ge him with an 
offense. See note 18, supra. So, if a "stop" is distinguished from 
" 
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of justification should not be demanded for all. "The at-
tempt to apply a single standard of probable cause to all 
[police] inter£ erences [with individual privacy and liberty] 
-i.e., to treat a stop as an arrest and a frisk as a search-
produces a standard either so strict that reasonable and 
necessary police work becomes unlawful or so diluted that 
the individual is not adequately protected." 56 Far more 
sensible, far more realistic, is the accommodating approach 
of "balancing" the extent of each particular police intru-
sion against the extent of its justification. This "balancing" 
approach (which seems to have been borrowed from the 
First Amendment area without carrying along the First 
Amendment's strong preference for individual freedom) 
finds its most articulate expression in Dean Edward L. 
Barrett's of ten quoted suggestion: 
"Would not the policy of the Fourth Amendment 
be better served by an approach which determines the 
reasonableness of each [police] investigative technique 
an "arrest" by the absence of charging purpose, the consequence 
is not that it is lawful without probable cause. but that it is un-
lawful even with probable cause. Thus it has been held under the 
Fourth Amendment in the case of "arrest for investigation," 
Staples v. United States, 320 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir. 1963), and thus 
it is, for the same reason, in the case of a "stop" which is sought 
to be distinguished from arrest only by the absence of charging 
purpose. (C) Its conclusion is irrelevant in any event. This is so, 
of course, because the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment are 
not cast in terms of "arrest." Thev are cast in terms of "seizures" 
of the person. An "arre~t" is a sei~ure of the person, but so is any 
other seizure, for ·whatever purpose. The "chari:?ing- purpose" 
argument, essentially a verbal quibble, is adequately laid to rest 
in Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the 
Law of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRDL & PoL. Sci. 402, 403-404 
(1960). 
-~ 6 Judge Keating for the Court of Appeals in Peters. See People 
v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 219 N. E. 2d 595, 600 (1966). 
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by balancing the seriousness of the suspected crime 
and the degree of reasonable suspicion possessed by 
the police against the magnitude of the invasion of 
the personal security and property rights of the in-
dividual involved?" 57 
The answer to that provocative question, amicus curiae 
submits, is a fiat and unequivocal No. However intellec-
tually reasonable Dean Barrett's balancing approach may 
be in the corridors of academe, it is a delusive and un-
workable proposition on the streets of our cities, and par-
ticularly on the streets of our ghettos where stop-frisk 
logic does its daily work. Closely inspected, we believe, 
both the "balancing" theory of Fourth Amendment rights 
and the Stop-Frisk lJf odel that is built upon it show them-
selves to be mere fine, scholastic pretexts for oppression. 
The "minor interference with personal liberty'; 58 that they 
sanction is a major interference; the protections which 
they promise are unrea~ illusions ; the "balance" scale 
which they purport to employ is im·ariably tipped by the 
police commissioner's thumb; and their consequence is noth-
ing more or less than a police dictatorship of the streets. 
\Ve urge this Court to repudiate any such triflings with 
the vital freedoms secured by the Fourth Amendment, and 
to respond as it did nearly one hundred years ago when 
asked to approve another like "minor" invasion of those 
same freedoms : 
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mild-
est and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and un-
57 Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth 
Amendment [1960], SUPREME CocRT REY. 46, 63. 
58 Chief Judge Silbert for the Court of Appeals in Terry. See 
State v. Terry, 5 Ohio .App. 2d 122, 214 N. E. 2d 114, 118 (1966). 
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~~:::· . constitutional practices get their first footing in that 
way, namely: by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedure. This can only 
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional 
provisions for the security of person and property 
should be liberally construed. . . . It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of 
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis." 59 
Let us examine first the nature of the "minor" invasion 
of liberty involved. Proponents of the "stop" like to por-
tray it as though it consisted at worst of a police "Hey, 
there." Several points should be obvious about this "Hey, 
there." 
(1) "Hey, there" itself, 'Yhen said by a policeman, is a 
significant intrusion, except perhaps to those fortunate 
citizens whose sole image of tl~e police is a Yague memory 
of the friendly face of the school crossing guard. Such 
citizens are not Yery often stopped. "Hey, there" to the 
man likely to be stopped-the man on the street in a "bad" 
neighborhood, the man in the ghetto-is a challenge, an 
act of dominion by the Fuzz, a thinly Yeiled threat of 
force. 
(2) "Hey, there" may or may not be thought unduly 
intrusive-once. But the man likely to be stopped is not 
likely to be stopped once. He is likely to be stopped again 
and again, day in day out, and for the same reasons. The 
following comment of a "lmYer income Negro," which the 
::9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886). 
611 
612 
36 
National Crime Commission's Task Force on Police thought 
worthy of publication, is a perfectly representative pic-
ture of ghetto life-and resultant ghetto attitudes: 
"When they stop everybody, they say, well, they 
haven't seen you around, you know, they want to get 
to know your name, and all this. I can see them stop-
ping you one time, but the same police stopping you 
every other day, and asking you the same old ques-
tion." 60 
(3) "Hey, there" looks better on paper than it sounds 
on the streets. (We put aside the consideration that it is 
almost invariably "Hey, there, boy" in the ghetto.61 ) "Field 
interrogation procedure" is thus described (at its mildest) 
in an instructional article for police: 
" ... Meeting head-on. Let the subject get up even 
with you or slightly beyond you. Then turn toward 
the subject facing his _side. Your hand should either 
be holding onto the subject's arm at the elbow or in a 
ready position so that you will be able to spin him 
forward and away from you in a defensive move. 
This is the position of interrogation. You should make 
60 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD1HNIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967). 
61 See CRAY, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 193; SKOLNICK, op. cit_ 
supra., note 3, at 80-82. The Crime Commission Task Force found 
that "field interrogations are frequently conducted in a discourte-
ous or otherwise offensive manner, which is particularly irritating 
to the citizen." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATIO~ OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 
185 ( 1967). An underlying study found that "Brusqueness or 
nastiness was evident in the approaches more often than was cour-
tesy." 2 University of Michigan Study 97 (emphasis in original). 
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a habit of interrogating from this position. Your great-
est hazard is the unknown." 62 
( 4) The method of police approach just described, the 
power of the policeman to make "Hey there" sound like a 
threat, and the inevitable citizen response together make 
the "stop" power a de facto arrest power. The pattern 
can be observed daily on any ghetto street. The police-
man on "aggressive patrol" (as it is coming to be known 
in police circles) makes his approach; the citizen, touched 
on the elbow or startled by the voice at his side and the 
policeman with his hands up, raises an arm slightly in an 
instinctive defensive gesture; the policeman is now free 
to arrest him for assaulting an officer, obstructing an offi-
cer, etc.63 Every policeman on the beat knows that the 
power to make an enforced stop is the power to escalate 
the episode into a technical "assault" and to make an 
arrest for the assault. The ghetto resident knows it too--
although he is seldom clever and dispassionate enough to 
avoid the trick. 
( 5) In any event, the authority which the proponents 
of "stop" seek to give the police is not the authority to 
say "Hey, there." It is the authority to detain the citizen 
who does not stop when "Hey, there" is said. It is the 
power to order him to a stand-still, and to lay hands on 
him if he moves. It is the power, in the American Law 
Institute's draft Model Code, to use all force short of 
deadly force to stop him. \Ye do not know that New York 
or Ohio law embodies even that humane limitation. Assum-
62 Adams, Field Interrogations, 7 POLICE 26, 28 (1963). 
63 One version of the pattern is described in CRAY, op. cit. supra, 
note 1, at 124-125. 
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ing that it does, the "stop" power ranges from a hand on 
the sleeve to a tackle, a patrol car careening up on the 
sidewalk, a bullet in the citizen's leg. It must be thus, we 
are informed, because "it would be frustrating and humili-
ating to the officer to grant him an authority to order 
persons to stop, and then ask him to stand by while his 
order is flouted." 64 
(6) Finally, the "stop" power comports the "frisk" 
power. The argumentation of the proponents of stop and 
frisk is, in this regard, wonderfully devious. We are told 
that "stop" should be allowed without probable cause be-
cause it is not very intrusive; and, in support of this propo-
sition, the attributes of "stop" alone are described (or 
partially described). Invariably, we are later told that the 
"frisk" power is absolutely indispensable to the safe exer-
cise of the police power to "stop"; hence, that once the 
power to "stop" is given, the power to "frisk" must fol-
low.65 We suggest that tJ:~is is chop-logic. If "frisk" is 
indeed the necessary accoutrement of "stop," we think it 
obvious that the kind of intrusion involved in "frisk" must 
be taken into account in the initial determination whether 
"stop" is, indeed, not very intrusive. We think that the 
intrusiveness of "frisk" hardly needs demonstration. 
We pass next to the supposed safeguard of stop and 
frisk-the preventive against its abuse-the prerequisite 
of "reasonable suspicion." Used as the English use it, 
the phrase means "probable cause" in the American con-
64 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE, Commentary to § 2.02, Tentative Draft No. 1, March 
1, 1966, at p. 100. 
65 See note 29 supra. 
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:ti-: stitutional sense.66 But where it is used to mean something 
.,.. less than probable cause, as it is in the Stop-Frisk Model, 
what exactly does it mean? It seems to mean, under Dean 
Barrett's balancing formula, the degree of suspicion which 
is sufficient so that the police ought to be allowed to do 
whatever it is they do, in light of its intrusiveness. That 
is a simply impossible test, depending as it does upon the 
normative appraisal of the policeman himself in the first 
instance and (in the few cases that come to court) upon 
the retrospective, subjective and impressionistic judgment 
of a lower-court judge who has before him a defendant 
caught with the goods. It should not be forgotten that this 
Court does not sit to decide every search-and-seizure case 
in this country, still less every stop-and-frisk case, still 
less every instance of stop and frisk. With all due def er-
ence, we suggest that the liberty of the citizen in ~he street 
would be a meaningless thing if it were committed almost 
wholly to ad hoc police and criminal court determinations 
of the normative propriety of particular police intrusions. 
One careful student of stop and frisk has offered the 
conception that "reasonable suspicion" is something more 
objective. "If probable cause ... can be defined as a rea-
sonable belief in the probability that a crime has been 
committed [and, to justify an arrest, that a particular 
citizen has committed it], ... [reasonable suspicion] means 
that it must be reasonably possible that the individual has 
committed some crime." 61 But as to what citizen is it not 
reasonably possible that he has committed some crime? 
As to what unknown citizen on the street (even a crowded 
street) near the scene of a known crime? As to what group 
66 See note 35 supra. 
67 Leagre, supra, note 15, at 413. 
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of ill-dressed young men on a ghetto street corner 7 As to 
what Negro abroad on the streets in a "white" neighbor-
hood late in the day! Surely, it is reasonably possible 
that each of these has committed a crime (or is about to 
commit one, as the New York statute and common Stop-
Frisk logic provide). "The :finger of suspicion is a long 
one. In an individual case it may point to all of a certain 
race, age group or locale. Commonly it extends to any 
who have committed similar crimes in the past. Arrest 
on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human 
right of liberty. It can be tolerated only in a society which 
is willing to concede to its government powers which his-
tory and experience teach are the inevitable accoutrements 
of tyranny." 88 
Speaking for the New York Court of Appeals in Peters, 
Judge Keating assures us that ""Where a person's activi-
ties are perfectly normal, he is fully protected from any 
detention or search." 89 That is hardly very reassuring.10 
It is still less reassuring- when it is announced that "By 
requiring the reasonable suspicion of a police officer, the 
statute incorporates the experienced officer's intuitive 
knowledge and appraisal of the appearances of criminal 
activity." 11 Yet here, we suggest, Judge Keating has laid 
his :finger precisely on the pulse of "reasonable suspicion" 
68 Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale 
and Rescue, 4 7 GEo. L. J. 1, 22 ( 1958) . 
69 People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 219 N. E. 2d 595, 600 (1966) 
(emphasis added). 
10 It also appears not to be an accurate statement of common 
stop and frisk law or practice. See the discussion of Pennsylvania's 
Hicks case, infra. 
11 People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 219 N. E. 2d 595, 599 (1966). 
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and given the best available sententious description of its 
character. 
For the native quality of "reasonable suspicion"-as op-
posed to the "probable cause" concept which our constitu-
tional law has heretofore developed-eonsists precisely in 
judicial recognition of the trained police "hunch" or "intui-
tion," without more, as the basis for legitimating police 
action. 72 All of the mysticism of police expertise, of police 
"feel" for a street situation, is invoked here.13 Judges are 
not expected to detach themselves from the reasoning proc-
esses of the police. They are not to take an independent 
view of police logic. They are to assimilate police logic 
72 See, e.g., Goss v. State, 390 P. 2d 220 (Alaska, 1964) (sustain-
ing stop of automobile on nothing more than policeman's testimony 
that he observed it under the following "suspicious circumstances": 
it pulled away from the side of a commercial building at 12 :45 a.m. 
and drove one-half block without lights) ; People v. Beverly, 200 
Cal. App. 2d 119, 19 Cal. Rptr. 67 (D. C. A. 1962) (sustaining stop 
of automobile on nothing more than policeman's testimony that "it 
was kind of unusual for a car fo be coming out of that area [a 
street occupied primarily by automobile wreckers] at that time 
[ 9 :33 p.m.] . . . all the auto wreckers at that time is usually 
closed," 19 Cal. Rptr. at 69) ; Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. 
Super. 1, 223 A. 2d 873 (1966) (sustaining stop and frisk of pedes-
trian on downtown street at 4 :30 p.m. on ground that policemen 
obsened him five blocks from the scene of a burglary; the burglar 
was reported to be a Negro with a brown coat and mustache; 
pedestrian was a Negro with a light-colored coat needing a shave). 
73 See TIFFANY, McixTYRE & ROTENBERG, op. cit. supra, note 15, 
at 40: 
"Training officers and officers in command of patrol forces 
commonly urge patrol officers to rely on their own good sense 
and to learn which persons should be stopped and questioned 
from their own experiences in the field. Some police assert that 
it is not possible to express, in a meaningful way, the basis for 
the conclusion that the circumstances are sufficiently sus-
picious to justify a field interrogation. It is said that the 
officer must be 'beat-' or 'alley-wise.'" 
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and appraise the officer's work product by its lights. They 
are to accept the attitudes of police intelligence for the pur-
pose of adjudging the soundness of police guesswork-
exclusively in cases, of course, where that guesswork has 
already proved itself right. Sound police intuition thus 
becomes the measure of the citizen's protection under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
"\Vhat exactly is the nature of that intuition? Jerome 
Skolnick's recent systematic observation of the police con-
firms the obvious: 
"[T]he policeman's role contains two principal vari-
ables, danger and authority, which should be inter-
preted in light of a 'constant' pressure to appear 
efficient. The element of danger seems to make the 
policeman especially attentive to signs indicating a 
potential for Yiolence and lawbreaking. As a result, 
the policeman is generally a 'suspicious' person. 
" 
"However complex the motives aroused by the ele-
ment of danger, its consequences for sustaining police 
culture are unambiguous. This element requires him, 
like the combat soldier, the European Jew, the South 
. African ("·hite or black), to live in a world straining 
toward duality, and suggesting danger when 'they' 
are perceived. Consequently, it is in the nature of the 
policeman's situation that his conception of order em-
phasize regularity and predictability. It is, therefore, 
a conception shaped by persistent suspicion . ... 
"Policemen are indeed specifically trained to be sus-
picious, to perceive events or changes in the physical 
43 
surroundings that indicate the occurrence or probability 
of disorder. . . . " H 
74 SKOLNICK, J'C'STICE "WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 44, 47-48 (1966) (emphasis in original). See 
generally, id. at 42-48, 54, 59, 64-65, 83, 206-207, 217-218, 220, 232. 
Skolnick's observations were made in Oakland, California (sub 
nom. "Westville"), which has a particularly good and enlightened 
police department. Id. at 25, 32, 62. The observations are tersely 
summarized by Geoffrey Hazard, of the American Bar Foundation: 
" ... The chief environmental influence on police work is 
a sensitization to dangerous behavior. Dealing with dangerous 
behavior is at the same time the unique characteristic and the 
special responsibility of the police. This orientation to danger 
results in a peculiar type of social perception. If one's job 
is to deal with violence should it arise, it is both natural and 
prudent to develop an alertness for signs of violence. People 
incipient upon violence give off signs of their mood-agitation, 
loud and excited speech, changes in posture and position in 
preparation for action, and the like. The skill of the police 
is to notice these signs and to react to them. 0£ course, such 
signs are also emitted by people who are just naturally 
agitated, loud-mouthed, or shifty, and it is often difficult to 
tell what behavioral signs portend. The point is that, because 
they have special responsibilities, the police read these signs-
and others more subtle-in a way that other people do not. 
Compared to other people, they seem to have an anxiety neu-
rosis, as indeed in a relative sense they do. 
" 
" ... Beginning with the fact that deviance may be a sign 
of danger, the police tend to see all deviance as dangerous. 
Policemen's work thus tends to make policemen socially con-
servative in the most fundamental sense. This has all sorts 
of consequences. For one thing, it helps to explain the strong 
negative responses that the police tend to display toward such 
events as picketing, wearing beards and sandals, and other 
socially disassociative activities. For another, and perhaps 
more practically significant, the police are inclined to classify 
as crime all behavior that they see as discrepant with 'ordi-
nary' behavior, regardless of whether such behavior is tech-
nically a violation of law. This inclination is, of course, 
checked by other pressures-political, social, and legal-so 
619 
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This suspicious cast of mind is intensified in the ghetto. 
The policeman on patrol in the inner city has little under-
standing of the way of life of the people he observes, and 
he believes (with considerable justification)15 that they are 
hostile to him.16 The result is inevitable. "The patrolman 
that t.he police in operation do not fulfill their inclinations. 
The policeman's tendency to regard all deviance as crime is, 
however, a real and largely uncontrollable social force." 
Hazard, Book Review, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 226, 228-229 (1966). See 
also Schwartz (Herman), "Stop and Frisk" in New York Law and 
Practice: A Case Studv in the Abdication of Judicial Control 
Over the Police (unpubiished manuscript) 29-31, and authorities 
cited. 
• 5 "The hatred and fear of the police, whether overt or hidden, 
felt by many Negroes, Puerto Ricans and :\Iexican-Americans can-
not be overstated." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE 
POWER AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS 11 ( 1967). See also REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN' THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
ON THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMEXT 62-65 (1966); Cross, 
The Negro, Prejudice and the Police, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & PoL. 
Ser. 405, 407 (1964). Stop and frisk practice, of course, is a not 
inconsiderable part of the complex causes for this hatred and fear. 
See notes 108-10 infra. 
76 See BALDWIN, NOBODY KNows )!Y :N°A)IE 61-62 (Dell ed. 1963): 
" . . . None of the Police Commissioner's men, even with 
the best will in the world, have any way of understanding 
the lives led by the people they swagger about in twos and 
threes controlling. . . . 
" ... [The policeman] is facing, daily and nightly, people 
who would gladly see him dead, and he knows it. There is no 
way for him not to kn°'v it; there are few things under heaven 
more unnerving than the silent, accumulating contempt and 
hatred of a people. He moves through Harlem, therefore, like 
an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country; which is 
precisely what, and where, he is, and the reason he walks in 
twos and threes. And he is not the only one who knows why 
he is always in company: the people who are watching him 
know why, too .... " 
See also Brooks, New York's Finest, 40 COMMENTARY 29, 29-32 
(Aug. 1965). 
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in Westville, and probably in most communities, has come 
to identify the black man with danger .... " 11 Little won-
der that "field interrogations are sometimes used in a way 
which discriminates against minority groups, the poor, and 
the juvenile." 78 
This is not an isolated or ephemeral abuse, 79 nor one 
that courts can control under the rubric of "reasonable sus-
picion." Can any court say that the policeman is not rea-
sonably suspicious of the group of young men lounging on 
the ghetto corner T Of the man on parole for narcotics vio-
lations who consorts \vith anotherT Of the man walking at 
night with two companions who have records for robbery? 
Of the interracial couple in the neighborhood frequented 
by prostitutes T A police authority on field interrogation 
gives policemen this advice respecting the "selection of 
subjects": 
"A. Be suspicious. This is a healthy police attitude, 
but it should be controlled and not too obvious. [Sic.] 
"B. Look for the unusual. 
1. Persons who do not 'belong' where they are 
observed. 
2. Automobiles which do not 'look right.' 
3. Businesses opened at odd hours, or not accord-
ing to routine or custom. 
77 SKOLNICK, op. cit. supra, note 74, at 49. 
78 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 ( 1967). 
79 See note 3 supra. 
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"C. Subjects who should be subjected to field inter-
rogations. 
1. Suspicious persons known to the officer from 
previous arrests, field interrogations, and obserYa-
tions. 
4. Any person observed in the immediate vicinity 
of a crime very recently committed or reported as 
'in progress.' 
5. Known trouble-makers near large gatherings. 
6. Persons who attempt to avoid or evade the 
officer. 
7. Exaggerated unconcern over . contact with the 
officer. 
8. Visibly 'rattle~' when near the policeman.80 
9. Unescorted women or young girls in public 
places, particularly at night in such places as cafes, 
bars, bus and train depots, or street corners. 
20. ~Iany others. How about your own personal 
experiences ! " 81 
80 There doubtless is some safe middle ground between showing 
exaggerated unconcern for the officer and being visibly rattled in 
his presence, but one wonders how many inhabitants of our cities 
are sufficiently astute students of the police mind to find that 
ground. The same damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't dilemma 
is presented in BRISTOW, op. cit. infra, note 81, at 15. 
81 Adams, Field Interrogation, 7 POLICE 26, 28 (March-April 
1963). Similar generalizations are found in the leading texts. 
BRISTOW, FIELD INTERROGATION 13-19. 23. 31-46 (2d ed. 1964); 
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Is a judge to say that these bases of suspicion are unrea-
sonable1 How, in any meaningful way, is he to review a 
police "stop" based on any of them¥ 
The answer to this question is evident from the reports. 
The courts have not in fact imposed any limitations or re-
strictions upon the stop and frisk power once that power 
is granted. They have not done so because they could not 
do so-because the essence of the doctrine of stop and frisk 
on less than probable cause is judicial abdication to police 
judgment. The judicial decisions demonstrate trenchantly 
the practical unworkability of the Stop-Frisk ~Iodel. New 
York's cases will serve as an example.82 
As we shall see, the major failing of the cases is that "rea-
sonable suspicion" has proved to be a broad, all-purpose 
rubber stamp for validating police intrusions. Before pass-
ing to that point, however, we pause to examine the nature 
of the intrusions which the New York cases allow upon 
"reasonable suspicion." \Vhat_ appears from such examina-
tion is a thorough vindication of the most dire predictions 
of those commentators who warned that no mere wordplay 
PAYTON, PATROL PROCEDURE 179-188, 190-195 (1966). TIFFANY, 
1fcixTYRE & ROTENBERG, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 38-43, remark 
the failure of police departments generally to develop standards 
governing field interrogation and related practices. Bristow rather 
explicitly gives up the attempt: "The question of what is suspicious 
cannot be answered for the individual patrolman. Each officer must 
seek this answer for himself on a basis of his knowledge of the area. 
BRISTOW, op. cit. supra, at 19. 
82 The only other jurisdiction which has had substantial case-law 
development of the stop and frisk conception is California. The 
decisions there make up a pattern much like Ke'v York's. The cases 
are discussed in Note, Stop and Frisk in California, 18 HASTINGS 
L. J. 623 (1967). 
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could make a "stop" something less than an arrest, or 
"frisk" something less than a search. 83 
"The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an ar-
rest," the New York Court of Appeals announced in its first 
stop and frisk decision, explaining why "the ground upon 
which the police may make the inquiry may be less in-
criminating than the ground for an arrest .... " People 
v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 445, 201 N. E. 2d 32 (1964). 
Yet within two years, in the Peters case now before this 
Court, the Court of Appeals was prepared to sanction as 
a "stop" something that seems to all appearances a quite 
conventional arrest. A police officer collared Peters at gun-
point on a stairway between floors of a private apartment 
building. He tugged Peters down a flight of stairs to the 
next floor where he questioned him. He then felt his 
clothing, removed an opaque packet, took it out of Peters' 
reach, and searched it. About all that is wanting here to 
exhaust the powers ordinarily given an officer who makes 
an arrest is a trip to the precinct station. The question 
of the propriety of such a trip was not reached in Peters 
because the "frisk" had served its purpose. It had dis-
closed the making of a de j1tre arrest, which followed. In 
any event, the Court of Appeals had already made clear 
in People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65, 204 N. E. 2d 176 
(1964), that the "stop" power alone included a trip to the 
precinct station, if the officer found that desirable. Accord: 
83 CRAY, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 38; Foote, Law and Police Prac-
tice: Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 16, 37-38 
(1957); Foote, The Fourth Arnendment: Obstacle or Necess£ty in 
the Law of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & PoL. Sm. 402, 403-405 
(1960); Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use 
and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & PoL. Sci. 251 
(1966). 
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People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N. Y. S. 2d 
651 (1965). 
"The frisk is less . . . invasion [of privacy] than an 
initial full search of the person would be." So held People 
v. Rivera, sitpra, 14 N. Y. 2d at 446, reasoning that it 
'•ought to be distinguishable also on pragmatic grounds 
from the degree of constitutional protection that would sur-
round a full-blown search of the person." Ibid. However 
valid this proposition,s" its endurance was fleeting. In 
Pugach, supra, the Court of Appeals sustained as a "frisk" 
the searching of a brief case which police officers had taken 
from their "stopped" suspect in a squad car en route to the 
precinct station.ss Peters, we have seen, sustained the 
search of an opaque packet taken from the suspect and 
wholly within the control of an armed policeman. Sibron 
sustained a policeman 'vho "without first frisking the de-
fendant, reached into his pocket and pulled out ... nar-
s4 Consider the frisk described by police testimony in the record 
in People v. Hoffman, supra, as recorded by Schwartz, supra, note 
i4,at6: 
"I asked both the defendant and his passenger to put their 
hands on the roof of the police car and I started from their 
necks and ,..,.orked across their shoulders and under their arms 
(indicating) all the ,..,.ay down their sides and down each 
leg to determine whether they could possibly have a weapon 
on them or not." 
Schwartz reports on the basis of conversations with police that "the 
procedure employed in Hoffman is 'customary usage.'" Id., at note 
14. That report concurs with the procedures recommended for 
policemen in PAYTO~, op. cit. supra, note 81, at 224-228 (with 
photographs). Cf. TIFFANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, op. cit. supra, 
note 15, at 46-48. 
ss Compare United States v. Margeson. 259 F . Supp. 256 (E. D. 
Pa. 1966); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N. E. 2d 
840 (1964). 
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cotics." ss Lower New York courts have gone further. 
People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 196 
(Sup. Ct. 1966), authorizes search of a tin box standing 
atop a pile of other articles on the sidewalk near the sus-
pect. People v. Cassesse, 47 Misc. 2d 1031, 263 N. Y. S. 
2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (alternative ground), holds that a 
frisk may encompass the search of an automobile in which 
the "stopped" suspect is riding.81 There is no need to put 
our own characterization on this New York evolution of the 
"frisk." The Court of Appeals has recently reviewed its 
prior decisions and, explicitly recognizing that in Pugach, 
Sibron and Peters "the arresting [sic] officers engaged 
in 'searches' rather than 'frisks' in order to obtain inculpat-
ing evidence," nevertheless adhered to those holdings. Peo-
ple v. Taggart, C. A. N. Y., App. T. 2, No. 120, decided 
July 7, 1967. 
It is significant that the New York courts ha\·e 
:been as unable to restrain police subversion of the 
purpose of the ''frisks" that they haYe authorized as to 
contain their extent or intrusiveness. _-\.!though the New 
York statute authorizes only a search for weapons, and 
the Court of Appeals in sustaining its constitutionality 
continues to stress that concept, the police ignore it with 
impunity. The officer in Sibron, for example, had no con-
cern with weapons. He suspected Sibron of narcotics deal-
ings, asked him for narcotics, and searched him for nar-
cotics. Indeed, he was so little concerned \vith his own self-
protection, that he let Sibron go into his pocket.ss This is 
ss People v. Taggart, C. A. N. Y., App. T. 2, No. 120, decided 
July 7, 1967, slip opinion, p. 6 (describing Sibron). 
8 ~ Compare People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P. 2d 658 
(1963). 
88 See People v. Reason, supra, for a similar case. 
51 
apparently no rare practice. The National Crime Commis-
sion Task Force on Police reports that "In some cities, 
searches are made in a high proportion of instances not 
for the purpose of protecting the officer but to obtain drugs 
or other incriminating evidence. In New York, for example, 
where searches are permitted only when the officer reason-
ably believes he is in bodily danger, searches were made in 
81.6 percent of stops reported." 89 
Particularly as the scope of permissible "stop" and 
"frisk" expanded, and as evidence of their use as pretexts 
to justify plainly illicit searches accumulated, one might 
haYe expected the Court of Appeals to tighten up on the 
standards for "reasonable suspicion." It has not been able 
to do so. In the first place, the statutory requirement for 
a "frisk," that the officer "reasonably suspects ... he is 
in danger of life or limb," has been entirely abrogated by 
the X ew York Court. This has been done by recognizing 
·what appears to be a conclusive presumption that officers 
making a "stop" are always in danger.90 Such might very 
well be doubtful as a fact,91 but surely the Court of Ap-
59 PRESIDENT'S Co:r.nnssION o~ LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF J"CSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 185 
(1967). 
90 "The answer to the question propounded by the policeman may 
be a bullet: in any case the exposure to danger could be very great." 
People v. Rivera, supra, 14 N. Y. 2d at 446. See also People v. 
Peters. 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 219 X. E. 2d 595, 598 (1966) (although 
the officer had Peters collared and "\Vas armed, "the tables are 
easily turned"). 
91 It is rather interesting to notice that it is common practice 
for policemen not to search females, even when they arrest them. 
See ::.\Ielntyre & Chabraja, The Intensive Search of a Suspect's 
Body and Clothing, 58 J. CRDI. L., CRr:r.r. & PoL. Sci. 18 (1967) ; 
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peals cannot be faulted for believing that an officer may 
always "reasonably suspect" he is in danger.92 That is the 
nature of reasonable suspicion. 
As for the reasonable suspicion that is a statutory pre-
requisite to the initial stop, it is fair to say that police 
officers in New York State have been left to define that 
concept pretty much as they go along. In the recent Tag-
gart decision of the Court of Appeals, an anonymous tele-
phone tip that a described young man on a designated 
street corner had a gun was held to justify an officer's ac-
costing him, placing him against a wall, and searching his 
TIFFANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 20. 
The reasons for this appear to be a combination of chivalry, public 
relations, and political sensitivity. It may well be that women are 
less dangerous than men. But it may also be that the police do not 
lack other means than a \\"eapons search to protect themselves from 
a suspect or an arrestee with a concealed weapon. One may specu-
late, at least, as to whether the police are not here subordinating 
to considerations of political expediency a concern for their safety 
which this Court, in its cases authorizing warrantless search inci-
dent to arrest, thought sufficien~ly important to require the sub-
ordination of important Fourth .Amendment values. 
It is also interesting that Bristow in his work on field interroga-
tion does not mention a frisk for self protection. To him the search 
incident to field interrog-ation is the last step in the process and 
designed to determine "the subject's possible criminality." BRIS-
TOW, op. cit. supra, note 81, at 92. Bristow therefore seems of the 
view that probable cause is not a prerequisite for this search, al-
though it is desirable. 
"While it is true that the primary purpose of the search 
in a field interrogation is not to secure evidence, but to aid in 
establishing the subject's character or criminal tendencies, the 
legal rule of search and seizure should be conformed with 
whenever possible. The subject of search and seizure is pres-
ently receiving widespread interest on the part of the general 
public, and violations of supposed 'Constitutional Rights,' no 
matter how groundless, may bring unfavorable publicity." 
Id. at 93. 
n Bristow indicates that "the patrolman should assume every 
person he encounters may be armed." Id., at 25. 
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pockets. In Sibron, eight hours' observation of the defen-
fendant by a police officer discovered nothing but that he 
was holding conversations with a number of narcotics ad-
dicts; nothing passed hands, and the officer overheard none 
of the conversations. Reasonable suspicion was found. The 
procedural history of the case, as we read the record, 
portrays quite starkly the role of stop and frisk logic in 
the dialectic of Fourth Amendment evasion. The arresting 
officer appears at first to have wanted to present the case as 
an ordinary "dropsie"-one of those wonderfully lucky 
cases in which the defendant takes occasion to toss away a 
packet of heroin just as the officer appears on the horizon. 
(See Complaint, Sibron R. 1.) At the hearing, however, 
his testimony seemed designed to make out a "consent" 
case (id., 16). When the judge properly found no con-
sent (id., 19), the prosecutor persuaded him that there 
was probable cause for an arrest and search (id., 19-20). 
That, of course, would not stand up on the record, and 
"reasonable suspicion" stepped into the breach at one or 
another appellate stage. "Reasonable suspicion" being 
essentially unreviewable because the officer had a hunch 
which proved right, the Stop-Frisk Model amply served to 
justify the unjustifiable. 
We have found only one New York decision in which any 
court invalidated a stop for want of reasonable suspicion: 
People v. Anonymous, 48 Misc. 2d 713, 265 N. Y. S. 2d 
705 ( Cty. Ct. 1965), where an officer stopped a boy walking 
on a summer Sunday, in Hicksville, Long Island, with a 
carton of books. It is enlightening, we think, to compare 
that decision with People v. Reason, supra. In the latter 
case, reasonable suspicion was found to be made out by 
an officer's observation that two Negro men got very quickly 
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into a taxi, on a Harlem street, one carrying a portable 
phonograph and the other a portable T.V., during day-
light hours when the streets were full of people. A few 
days prior to this date, the officer had attended a com-
munity meeting at which residents complained of numer-
ous burglaries in the area, but no complaint was made 
of burglaries in the building before which the two Negro 
men were seen to hail a cab, nor in the immediate sur-
roundings, nor did the officer have any information relat.. 
ing to any burglaries accomplished or in progress on that 
.date. Harlem is not Hicksville, however; burglaries do 
occur frequently in Harlem; and there, doubtless lies the 
difference in the cases. Such again is the nature of reason-
able suspicion. 
One additional point in the New York experience deserves 
note. Coincidentally with the enactment of the . Stop and 
Frisk statute in that State, a circular was issued by the 
New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement 
Officials setting guidelines for. police performance under the 
stop and frisk authorization. That circular is appended as 
Appendix A to this brief. Inter alia, it provides that the 
suspect is to be questioned and frisked "in the immediate 
area in which he was stopped," but see People v. Pugach, 
supra; People v. Hoffman, supra; that for "purposes of 
practical enforcement procedures," the language of the 
statute "abroad in a public place" does not include public 
portions of private buildings, such as hotel lobbies, etc., 
but see People v. Peters, supra; and that if "the suspect 
is carrying an object such as a handbag, suitcase, sack, 
etc., which may conceal a weapon, the officer should not 
open that item, but should see that it is placed out of 
reach of the ·suspect so that its presence will not repre-
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sent any immediate danger to the officer," but see People 
v. Pugach, supra; People v. Peters, supra; People v. Rea-
son, supra; and People v. Cassesse, supra. Obviously, offi-
cers have regularly broken these rules, and the New York 
courts as regularly have ignored them. The rules-flexible 
and imprecise as they are-appear to be altogether too con-
fining for a volatile conception of the nature of reasonable 
suspicion. 
We submit that what has happened even on the face 
of the reported judicial decisions in New York fully con-
firms our description earlier in this brief of the inevitable 
consequences of the Stop-Frisk Model. "Stops" have been 
sanctioned that are not distinguishable in the extent of 
their invasion of privacy from arrests; full-blown searches 
are conducted in the name of "frisks"; and "reasonable 
suspicion," incapable alike of explanation and judicial 
supervision, serves only as a sophistical pretext for the 
wholesale destruction of Fourth Amendment rights. 
We do not think that the New York experience is aberrant 
in this regard, or that other States and other varieties of 
stop and frisk might succeed where New York and its 
section 180-a have totally failed. It is the basic Stop-Frisk 
Model, we believe, that is aberrant. The intrusions which 
it authorizes against the liberty and privacy of the citizen 
are intolerable in a free society, unless they are hedged 
about with effective checks and restraints. Such restraints 
involve, first, the requirement of particularized justification 
for the use of the intrusions against particular individuals 
reliably believed to be criminally connected. They require, 
second, that the justificatory standard be couched in terms 
sufficiently objective and communicable that the. citizen 
can ascertain some inkling of the nature of his rights and the 
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policeman some conception of his powers and their limi-
tations, so that, if those limitations be oppressively 
transgressed, the policeman and his superiors can be 
held accountable legally or politically as the case may be. 
They require, in this last aspect, some fair opportunity 
for independent review by the judiciary of the policeman's 
asserted justification for intrusion upon the citizen. The 
means of providing these several related safeguards in 
Anglo-American law has always been the probable cause 
concept; and this Court has noted that it is a "trouble-
some line" which separates "mere suspicion" from probable 
cause. Brinegar· v. United States, 339 U. S. 160, 176 
(1949). The innovation of stop and frisk theory which pur-
ports to straddle that line with a turbid, amorphous, un-
substantial conception of some state of police-perceived 
putative guiltiness that is more than suspicion but less 
than cause-whether the state be called "reasonable sus-
picion" or some other euphemism-is inherently, irremedi-
ably defective. 
The defect is exposed, we suggest, at the point where the 
Stop-Frisk Model meets the real world of streets and 
courts. There is nothing endemically wrong with the idea 
of stop and frisk. Indeed, the mission of stop and frisk 
theory to establish some third state of police powers, mid-
way between those that can be exercised wholly arbitrarily 
(such as the power of non-coercive, non-detentive street 
questioning) and those available only upon probable cause 
(such as arrest and search), has the allure of sweet rea-
sonableness and compromise. The rub is simply that, in 
the real world, there is no third state; the reasonableness 
of theory is paper thin; there can be no compromise. Prob-
able cause is the objective, solid and efficacious method of 
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reasoning-itself highly approximative and adaptable, but 
withal tenacious in its insistence that common judgment 
and detached, autonomous scrutiny fix the limits of police 
power-which has become, within our system of criminal 
law administration, the indispensable condition of non-
arbitrariness in police conduct. Police power exercised 
without probable cause is arbitrary. To say that the 
police may accost citizens at their whim and may detain 
th.em upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that 
the police may both accost and detain citizens at their whim. 
But against that dangerous doctrine the Fourth Amend-
ment sets its head. We urge that the Court so hold, un-
equivocally and forcefully, in these cases. 
We so urge although we recognize that, in some ways, 
the issues before the Court in the Sibron, Peters and Terry 
cases are framed quite narrowly. The immediate questions 
are whether, on each record, the respective rights of Sibron, 
Peters and Terry were violated and, in the New York 
cases, whether Code of Cririiinal Procedure, ~ 180-a is 
facially unconstitutional, see Berger v. New York, supra. 
Those questions naturally invite attention to the factual 
circumstances of each case-which show, we think, differ-
ing degrees of police intrusiveness and differing degrees of 
ostensible justification for it-and to the detailed body 
of legal rules (which might be held separately or in com-
bination offensive to the Fourth Amendment) that emerge 
from the several provisions of the New York statute as con-
strued. In this situation, we earnestly hope that the Court 
will not choose to tre:at the questions before it as isolated 
and independent matters-perhaps, in the process, giving 
some color of authority to a "balancing" theory of the 
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Fourth Amendment.93 Apart from Sibron, Peters and 
Terry, thousands of our citizens daily are being stopped, 
detained and searched without probable cause. The extent 
of the intrusion varies from case to case; but all are uncon-
stitutional, we believe, if there is (a) any restraint, or com-
municated sense of restraint, of the citizen's liberty of 
movement; or (b) any physical touching, probing, "frisk-
ing" or searching of the citizen, (.c) without probable cause 
in its time-honored Fourth Amendment sense. We urge 
the Court to so declare. 
IV. 
Stop-and-Frisk, Law Enforcement and the People. 
We have as yet said nothing about the various arguments 
to necessity and/or efficiency of the proponents of stop and 
frisk. We think that, on any fair appraisal of the state of 
present knowledge,9 ' those arguments can be dispatched 
summarily: either as nof proved (as the Court viewed 
similar arguments urged upon it from Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U.S. 227 (1940), to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 
(1966)), or as necessarily subordinated by the Constitu-
tion of the United States (as the Court viewed the efficiency 
arguments made in Berger v. New York, supra). Par-
ticularly where, as here, the argument of police need is 
advanced to support the allowance of new police powers 
-powers never heretofore given under the Constitution; 
indeed, powers that erode pro tanto the bedrock principle 
of probable cause which undergirds the settled constitu-
93 See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
9" See the literature collected in notes 15, 81 supra. 
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tional doctrine of the Fourth Amendment-we believe that 
the showing of need required to sustain the argument 
should be both factually convincing and normatively com-
pelling. The argument of police need for street detention 
and frisk powers is neither. 
Professor Herman Goldstein, a long-time student of the 
police and police administrator put the matter most suc-
cinctly in a recent article: 
"It is probably true that a program of preventive 
patrol does reduce the amount of crime on the street, 
although there has been no careful effort to measure 
its effectiveness. It is also apparent, however, that 
some of the practices included in a preventive patrol 
program contribute to the antagonism toward the 
police felt by minority groups whose members are 
subjected t·o them. A basic issue, never dealt with ex-
plicitly by police, is whether, even from a purely law 
enforcement point of view, the gain in enforcement 
outweighs the cost of community alienation." 95 
Others have asked the same or similar questions.98 
Proponents of stop and frisk are fond of asserting that 
"aggressive patrol" keeps the crime rate down. We have 
not seen convincing evidence of this proposition. But even 
were it established that the result of aggressive patrol was 
95 Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improv-
ing Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1967). 
96 See Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. 
REV. 181, 201 (1966); Norris, Constitutional, Law Enforcement Is 
Effective Law Enforcement: Toward a .Concept of Police in a 
Democracy and a Citizens' Advisory Board, 43 U. DET. L. J. 203, 
221-224 (1965); Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in 
tke Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 16, 28. 
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a decrease in street crime, of course it would not follow that 
the stop and frisk methods of aggressive patrol were neces-
sary to achieve the decrease. Aggressive patrol involves 
both increased police presence on the streets and increased 
police intrusion. To say, when a program of aggressive 
patrol is followed by lower rates of reported crime (if it is) 
that the increased intrusion, or the combination of increased 
intrusion and presence is causing the observed effect-
rather than that the increased presence alone is causing it-
is mere speculation. The South African "blitz" practice de-
scribed in note 11, supra, provides an obvious example. We 
are told that when a wave of 1000 to 2500 policemen suddenly 
inundates an area and manhandle all the blacks in sight, 
the robbery rate falls 50 per cent. That is an impressive 
figure. But one is led to wonder whether the robbery rate 
would not be quite as startlingly affected if 1000 to 2500 
policemen suddenly appeared on the streets of the same 
small area, even if they did not stop and search the blacks. 
Surely, 2500 policemen floodi_ng a neighborhood would have 
some effect, even if they did nothing but stand on the corners 
and talk to one another.97 
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However that may be, the point remains, as Professor 
Goldstein notes·, that the evidence of the ill effects of stop 
and frisk practices, particularly in the ghetto, is as strong 
at least as any evidence of their good effects "from a purely 
law enforcement point of view." We have earlier noted the 
obvious, unhappy fact that the policeman today is the ob-
97 For suggestions of the strong effect of increased police presence 
alone on crime control, see Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Ob-
stacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & 
PoL. SCI. 402, 405 (1960); Kennedy, Crime in the Cities: Improv-
ing the Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIM. & 
PoL.-·Sc1. 142;143 (1967). 
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ject of widespread and intense hatred in our inner cities.18 
The National Crime Commission's Task Force on Police 
points to stop and frisk practices as one (obviously, only 
one) of the causes of this phenomenon. 
"Misuse of field interrogations ... is causing serious 
friction with minority groups in many localities. This 
is becoming particularly true as more police depart-
ments adopt 'aggressive patrol' in which officers are en-
couraged routinely to stop and question persons on 
the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, 
or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evi-
dent. The Michigan State survey found that both mi-
nority group leaders and persons sympathetic to minor-
ity groups throughout the country were almost unani-
mous in labelling field interrogation as a principal 
problem in police community relations." 99 
The least implication of these observations is that the 
police assertion of a need for_ stop and frisk power may 
itself reflect the same battle psychology100 that is respon-
sible for over-frequent use of the power-a psychology that 
is not always conducive to the best judgment, even on the 
question of what is good for the police. But the observa-
tions have other, more troubling implications which, in 
candor, we cannot pretermit. We are gravely concerned 
by the dangers of legitimating stop and frisk, and thus en-
couraging, and increasing the frequency of occasions for, 
98 See note 75 supra. 
99 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967). 
100 See notes 7 4-77 supra. See also SKOL.~ICK, op. cit. supra, note 
74, at 87-88, 105. 
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police-citizen aggressions. Speaking bluntly, we believe 
that what the ghetto does not need is more stop and frisk. 
It is no accident that many major riots suffered since 
1964 have been sparked by a public confrontation between 
the police and Negroes. Regardless of the underlying fac-
tors which set the stage for riot or increase its likelihood, 
it is plain that police-community encounters have triggered 
outbreaks of group hostility: 
In Cincinnati a Negro man protesting the death 
sentence of another Negro is arrested. In Boston, po-
lice advance with truncheons on women sitting-in at 
the welfare department. In Tampa, a cop shoots a 
Negro burglary suspect in the back after he had re-
fused to halt. Each incident triggered violence. Stores 
were burned and looted, people injured. Rioting ended 
in Boston not because the police had dispersed crowds, 
but because the cops went away.101 
Or as the New York Times put it: 
"Even before Newark the script was familiar. Some 
minor incident begins it all, often the arrest of a 
Negro by a policeman." 102 
We do not suggest, we emphasize lest we be misunder-
stood, that police conduct in any way "causes" riot or is 
responsible for it. Would it were so; the wrong could then 
be more readily righted. We will not repeat the "appall-
101 "Summer Riots" New Republic, June 24, 1967, p. 7. See also 
Hayden, The Occ1ipation of Newark, 9 New York Review of Books, 
No. 3, Aug. 24, 1967, p.14. 
102 Edit., New York Times July 16, 1967. 
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ingly familiar, statistical litany" 103 of social ills which are 
responsible. We only observe that the frustration and bit-
terness of poverty, unemployment, slum housing, ignorance 
and segregation easily fixes on the police; that in return, 
and often for quite good reasons, the police view the 
Negro with fear; and-how apt the word here-suspicion. 
The bloody turmoils which we have experienced are ignited 
and intensified by this mutual hostility. 
The gap between Negroes and the police is enormous. A 
study by the National Crime Commission shows that "non-
whites, particularly Negroes, are significantly more nega-
tive than whites in evaluating poliee effectiveness in law 
enforcement." 104 Negroes and whites have widely different 
perceptions of police discourtesy, misconduct and honesty 
and the need for police protection.105 The Commission's 
study supports the conclusions of the Director of the Lem-
berg Center for the Study of Violence, in a letter to coun-
sel, that the police and Negro youth have perceptions of 
each other which escalate the conflict between them.106 
You have asked whether the Lemberg Center for the 
Study of Violence is in a position to make a state-
ment on police-community relations as they affect 
behavior within the Negro ghetto. We have done a 
103 Rustin, Black Power and Coalition Politics 42 Commentary 37 
(Sept.1966). 
104 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCE2.!ENT A...""'lD ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 146 (1967). 
105 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT A}."D ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT : THE POLICE 146-149 
( 1967). 
106 The original of Dr. Spiegel's letter of July 14, 1967 has been 
deposited with the clerk. 
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great deal of face-to-face interviewing with Negroes 
in the ghettos of six different cities and have accu-
mulated observations on some of the psychological 
aspects of interactions between Negro youth and young 
adults on the one hand and white police officers on 
the other. 
Aecording to our observation, police attitudes toward 
working class Negro youths and young adults are often 
based on the concept of the Negro as a savage, or 
animal, or some being outside of the human species. 
Therefore, the police expect behavior from Negroes 
in accordance with this concept. The young Negroes in 
cities have complementary attitudes toward police of-
ficers. The police are perceived as animal-like, brutal, 
and sadistic-again, outside the human speeies. 
Because of the police officers conception of the Negro 
male, he frequently feels that most Negroes are dan-
gerous and need to be dealt with as an enemy even 
in the absence of visible criminal behavior. Since he 
feels that he is dealing with an unreliable and power-
ful enemy, he has to deal with the threat in drastic 
ways, namely by suddenly and ruthlessly stripping and 
disarming any Negro who has aroused his suspicion. 
Because of the Negro's concept of the police, the young 
Negro male feels that he has only two alternatives 
open to him-intense resistance or abject surrender. 
These complementary attitudes result in a vicious 
circle of behavior which serves to confirm the image 
which Negro males and police officers hold of each 
other. In addition, police practices meant to over-
power or cow the suspect before evidence of his of-
.. 
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fense is obtained have mainly a provocative effect. 
Such provocation is especially unfortunate in that it 
tends to produce an impression in the suspect that 
the police are not only as brutal as assumed, but are 
also frightened. In the mind of the Negro male, the 
poli.:!e officer is over-reacting to the potential offense 
involved in the usual situation and this over-reaction is 
probably the result of fear as well as sadism. If the 
policeman is perceived as either frightened or brutal, 
the Negro male develops an attitude of contempt for 
the policeman as for his authority. 
It is clear to me that it will be difficult to correct 
this complex process of interaction. As a start, bet-
ter guidelines are needed for police behavior in respect 
to young Negro males. Specifically, it would be help-
ful if the police were trained to make more careful 
discriminations, wherever possible, with respect to 
potential Negro offenders. They should begin by 
interrogating any suspect as if he were a human be-
ing and as if he could be trusted to give responsible 
answers to the police officer in his mandatory role of 
investigating possible criminal behavior. It is often 
said that the police should be asked to show more "re-
spect" for ghetto dwellers. I think this expression over-
simplifies the situation as it is difficult to show respect 
to someone not considered to be a human being. My 
idea is that police officers should have more familiar-
ity with the psychology of Negro youths so that they 
could make a more differentiated and appreciated re-
sponse to t:ieir behavior. This would enable the police 
officer more readily and reliably to distinguish those 
Negro youths who are actually dangerous from those 
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who would cooperate with police officers if they were 
treated as responsible human beings. 
I realize that these statements are only a beginning 
and that much more work in this area needs to be done. 
However, I hope that you will find what I have to say 
helpful in your own work. 
John P. Spiegel, M.D. 
Director 
The Center's study of recent riots describes how police 
conduct may function, if perceived as unjust, to ignite 
violence: 
" . . . riots tend to break out as a result of the 
interaction of two factors-the 'grievance level' of 
people in the ghetto and the inflammatory nature of 
the event which precipitates the initial disturbance. 
These two factors are in a reciprocal relation with 
each other: the higher the grievance level, the slighter 
the event required to trigger the riot. Low levels of 
Negro discontent require an event which is highly in-
flammatory in order that a riot break out. An 'inflam-
matory event' is usually an incident which is initiated 
by white people and 'vhich is perceived by black people 
in the ghetto as an act of injustice or as an insult to 
their community. The greater the injustice is per-
ceived to be, the more 'inflammatory' is the effect of 
the incident.101 
107 Six Cities Study-a Survey of Racial Attitudes in Six North-
ern Cities : Preliminary Findings, A Report of the Lemberg 
Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis UniYersity, June 1967. 
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There is, therefore, growing dissatisfaction on the part 
of many Negroes, especially the young, which focuses on 
the police as the most visible and provocative members of 
the white community. At the same time, police conduct 
and capacity is viewed in a dramatically distinct manner 
by Negroes, the police and other residents of the community. 
In such a context, the need for "better guidelines . . . 
for police behavior", as Dr. Spiegel writes, is obvious. The 
National Crime Commission Task Force on Police felt com-
pelled to repeat again and again the conclusion we have pre-
viously noted: that "field interrogations are a major source 
of friction between the police and minority groups" 108 and 
that "misuse of field interrogations" causes "serious fric-
tion with minority groups in many localities." 109 Arbitrary 
police conduct epitomizes, and sets off a response to, many 
grievances.110 
lOS PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w EN"FORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967) . 
109 Id., at 184. Although the Crime Commission believes that 
there is a need to authorize the police to stop suspects and possible 
\vitnesses of major crimes to detain them for brief questioning and 
to search for dangerous weapons. the Commission recommends 
such .authority be hedged about with restrictions \vhich the New 
York and Ohio practices under scrutiny do not contain. Id. at 185. 
In addition, the Commission concluded that "arrests for investiga-
tion or on suspicion, whatever label is attached, should be abolished 
by all departments that now utilize them. This practice has long 
been a source of justified community hostility." The Commission 
reached this conclusion after surveying arrest statistics which 
sho,ved that arresting persons as a means of detaining them while 
an investigation of their possible involvement in the crime is con-
ducted has been a common practice. But as we have shown, there 
is no real distinction between arrest on suspicion and detention 
and search for suspicion. 
110 See id., at 185 : 
'The study concluded that the juveniles understood being 
sought and interrogated for their illegal activity: 
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To legitimate detention and search on "reasonable sus-
picion"-without probable cause-therefore is to give free 
reign to police intervention in the most dangerous way 
(without objective standards) in the most dangerous place 
(the ghetto street). If the police and the ghetto dweller 
view each other with fear, suspicion, often hatred, any en-
forced stop is a potential source of conflict. But when the 
stop is based on the inarticulate, unregulated judgment of 
the cop on the beat, the potential is magnified. 
We do not suppose that such considerations as these can 
or should determine the Fourth Amendment question. We 
have rested our constitutional submission not on them, but 
on the firm grounds of history, authority and (we respect-
fully submit) reason, set out in Parts I-III of this Brief. 
However, we anticipate that the States of New York and 
Ohio will make the familiar inflated claims for stop and 
frisk as tools of law and order. If they do, let there be 
no mistake about this call to practicality. Whatever its con-
veniences and benefits to a narrow view of law-enforcement, 
stop and frisk carries with it an intense danger of inciting 
destructive community conflict. To arm the police with an 
inherently vague and standardless power to detain and 
search, especially where that power cannot effectively be 
'If you done something and you be lying and yelling when 
the boys from juvy come around and they catch you lying, 
well, what you gonna do? You gonna complain 'cause you 
was caught? Hell man, you can't do that. You did something 
and you was caught and that's the way it goes. 
But they were indignant about field interrogation for offenses 
they did not commit-when "we were just minding our own 
business when the cops came along." And they particularly 
resented being singled out because of their clothes or hair: 
"Hell man, them cops is supposed to be out catching criminals! 
They ain't paid to be lookin' after my hair!" The juveniles 
consider this harassment by the police as a policy of confine-
ment by a "foreign army of occupation."' 
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regulated, contributes to the belief which many Negroes 
undeniably have that police suspicion is mainly suspicion 
of them, and police oppression their main lot in life. Arbi-
trary police interrogation, street detention, and frisk are 
nothing less than a major part of that social and psycho-
logical constellation which in them produces "untoward 
counter reactions of violence." Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 
2d 197, 204, n. 7 (4th Cir.1966). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that neither stops nor frisks 
may he made without probable cause. In each of these 
cases, the judgment of conviction should he reversed. 
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